Enhancing Community Development in Adelaide by Building on the Social Capital of South Australian Muslims

Lauren Tolsma
and Zuleyka Zevallos
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Institute for Social Research
Swinburne University of Technology
PO Box 218, Hawthorn
Victoria 3122, Australia
http://sisr.net

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Cover: Conferring of Awards 2008, Faculty of Health Science University of Adelaide.
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Executive Summary

This report provides a sociological analysis of the settlement and support services available to Muslim migrants living in the suburbs of Greater Adelaide, in the state of South Australia. In particular, we seek to learn how existing Muslim organisations address the collective needs of Muslim migrants in Adelaide. We present a critical analysis of the literature on community development with specific focus on the provision of services that aid economic development. Broadly, we use the term ‘community development’ to refer to the process of organising, educating and encouraging the participation and collaboration of local residents and stakeholders in order to improve their collective outcomes and objectives. Stakeholders might include practitioners who work in the social welfare sector, community leaders, businesses and government agencies who work with Muslim communities. These stakeholders are able to provide funds, or exchange their skills, services, prestige or other forms of support in order to achieve social change. As a pilot case study of community development, we incorporate previously unpublished data on South Australian Muslim community organisations. This includes interviews with service providers, representatives and religious leaders, as well as field notes during visits to organisations and the public events that these groups hosted around Adelaide in 2008.

Our report considers different forms of social capital in relation to Muslim community development and service provision. Social capital refers to the norms, knowledge and status enacted by social actors through their participation in social networks in order to become more socially mobile, particularly by tapping into the resources and capacities of other groups who are better off. This concept is used to examine the power dynamics in negotiations of social and economic exchange among different Muslim organisations and other groups, including mainstream service providers and government officials. Our study finds that many newly arrived Muslim migrants do not understand the breadth of government-sponsored services available to them, and so they largely rely on a couple of the smaller and widely trusted Muslim community organisations for all of their needs, rather than approaching mainstream organisations for specialised services. In this connection, because some Muslim organisations have stronger visibility among new arrivals, some groups are struggling to manage their members’ requirements, especially given their limited resources. Consequently, a small number of over-worked volunteers deliver targeted assistance for which they have no formal training or qualifications. This includes crisis counselling, occupational assistance and educational advice.

We suggest that an asset-based community development (ABCD) approach would strengthen the social network ties and resources both within and external to the Muslim organisations studied. The ABCD framework is an evaluation methodology which first identifies the social and material capacities that presently exist within particular organisations. This information is used to establish practical ways in which those resources might be used to enhance their service delivery. In order to mobilise the existing assets of Muslim organisations around South Australia, the report proposes the establishment of a South Australian Muslim Community Corporation (SAMCC) which would consist of Muslim community service providers, volunteers and their Muslim clients from around South Australia. We propose a number of recommendations regarding the SAMCC including:
• **Assisting equitable decision making among Muslim organisations via the SAMCC.** Rather than solely privileging religious leaders, the SAMCC is set up to encourage the inclusion of a broader range of Muslim ‘voices’ that would contribute to community development activities;

• **Recruiting a SAMCC media liaison to help disseminate important information via a multi-lingual, regularly updated Muslim community newsletter and website.** This includes promoting non-Muslim participation in community events, focusing on secular activities, and making available a list of culturally sensitive, mainstream service providers to Muslim community groups;

• **Restructuring the existing grants scheme of community funding.** This is with a view to supporting the long-term self-sustainability of a wider range of ‘grassroots’ Muslim community organisations;

• **Funding training and hiring professional staff.** This would ease the burden of Muslim organisations that are widely used and trusted but currently over-extended, while still allowing them to continue providing specialised services for Muslim migrants.

The idea of the SAMCC is to provide sustainability for the Muslim community groups currently in operation, by pooling together and taking better advantage of their existing resources. In this way, it complements the asset-based approach to community development, by mobilising existing social networks and the value that those networks have for ordinary Muslims living in South Australia.
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1. Introduction

Empirical studies identify that Australian Muslims are socially and economically marginalised in comparison to other groups (see for example Betts and Healy 2006; Hassan 2009; Kabir 2007). The Australian government has adopted a whole-of-government approach in attempting to address this marginalisation, by funding several research projects and community programs around Australia (AHRC 2009; DIAC 2007; FaHCSIA 2008; McCue 2008; Reza 2007; Wise and Ali 2008; Yasmeen 2008). Our report aims to sketch out a practical (albeit preliminary) policy agenda to enhance the systems of support available to Muslim migrants in South Australia. This is with a view to strengthening the social, material and economic resources of the communities where Muslims live. We present a sociological study of the community services available in the central suburbs of Greater Adelaide. While Muslims make up a diverse religious category of several sectarian, ethnic and linguistic origins, we focus on centrally located organisations that specifically operate as ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ support groups, including mosque-related groups, social clubs and women’s groups. Due to resource limitations, the analysis excludes the study of Muslim organisations in rural and coastal regions, and so the findings only represent suburban Muslim organisations in Adelaide.

The title of this report suggests that community development benefits all the residents in the Adelaide region, not just Muslims, by building on the networks that Muslim organisations have to other non-Muslim groups. Community development refers to a local project of social transformation which involves several stakeholder groups, including governments, service providers, businesses and ordinary residents, working together in order to improve the physical and social infrastructure of local communities (Phillips and Pittman 2009: 6). We draw on a model of applied sociological practice. This refers to the use of social theories and techniques in order to provide answers to research questions and concerns that affect particular groups or clients (Zevallos 2009). Our primary aim is to use the literature and ethnographic data in order to: sketch some of the key approaches that some Muslim organisations adopt in order to assist Muslim migrants living in South Australia, in particular, to learn and build upon how they overcome challenges in finding new resources through their networking. We position the concepts, methods and data presented in this report as a ‘pilot study’. This is because the qualitative focus of the analysis is not intended to be a cohesive or generalised model for Muslim communities in South Australia. Instead, we set up a starting point of collective action that could include community groups who wish to enhance the socio-economic position of Muslim migrants and the communities where they live. This includes practitioners (community volunteers, activists, service providers and other professionals), ordinary community members (both Muslim and otherwise) and stakeholders (including policy makers, community leaders and philanthropists).

Our report uses the academic literature and ethnographic materials in order to develop an enhanced understanding of the support services available to Muslims living in Adelaide. Ethnography describes a set of methods where a researcher participates in people’s lives for a period of time, overtly or sometimes covertly, through direct interaction and observation, watching, listening and collecting any information that may shed light on their research topic (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 3). Ethnographic data collected between February and July 2008 are used to provide the empirical context for a discussion on practical issues of community
development and service delivery in South Australia. This includes data from public resources, observations and field notes from visits to community organisations and events, as well as interview material with representatives of Muslim organisations and their members. The empirical insights are concise and intentionally presented in broad strokes. The literature review and data analysis are used in order to set up a preliminary outline for thinking about enhanced community planning and in order to better inform policy recommendations.

The report begins by establishing a working meaning of community, by drawing on sociological theory, and it then discusses the literature on community development. Next, an analysis of the concept of social capital is presented with reference to its application to community development programs. Social capital describes the social and material resources that social actors might utilise via their social networks in order to better their social positioning, including the norms, values, knowledge and power that individuals enact in order to sustain social participation and encourage social mobility (Bourdieu 1985; Lin 1999a; Woolcock and Narayan 2000). The report then engages with the Australian literature on the socio-economic issues facing Australian Muslim communities. Next, we reflect on the study’s ethnographic methodology. The research techniques, skills, strategies and other considerations that are discussed might help practitioners and stakeholders to learn more about how to elicit the collaborative participation of Muslim community organisations around Adelaide. In particular, we discuss some approaches for reaching out to disengaged and hard-to-reach groups who are less likely to participate in social research or community projects. The report goes on to consider its ethnographic findings with respect to social capital. It finds that the resource and power differences among the larger and smaller Muslim community organisations might be better managed. The final section of this report makes several preliminary policy recommendations to this effect, centring on the establishment of a South Australian Muslim Community Corporation (SAMCC).

We argue that the SAMCC represents an avenue to actively negotiate the exchange of resources and power among Muslim community organisations around South Australia. It would also help to strengthen their links to more powerful social agents, such as government and mainstream service providers. The SAMCC would operate as a grassroots collective, consisting of community leaders, service providers, stakeholders, volunteers and their clients. It potentially stands to be a more inclusive system of decision making which encourages greater participation by smaller community groups and residents, thus empowering ‘ordinary’ Muslims in their civic engagement and increasing their sense of connection to broader Australian society. The community development framework presented therefore aims to foster a greater sense of social cohesion by encouraging Muslim organisations to work together in order to overcome some of the financial and service management issues that individual groups are currently facing.

The following section provides our definition of ‘community’ and its relationship to the community development literature.

2. Community development

The word ‘community’ conjures up many different meanings to different people. In sociological theory, the concept is sometimes used to refer to a shift in the values
underpinning social belonging, from a society based on a strong sense of social solidarity and community obligation, to individualistic societies typified by weak (or impersonal) social ties and self-interest (Toennies 1963 [1887]). This societal transition is sometimes discussed in terms of a loss of trust, social connectedness and civic participation in advanced economies (Putnam 2000). Other analyses are not so pessimistic about the shift from the communitarian ideals and breaking away from traditional norms. This includes having more specialised social roles, freedom and a mutual interdependence based on diversity, rather than on parochial customs (Durkheim 1964 [1893]). Other theorists see an increased value in the diffusion of weak social networks, particularly with respect to finding more meaningful work through casual acquaintances (Granovetter 1973).

A review of the sociological theories of community position the most useful definition as a collective of people who share common activities or beliefs (or both, in some cases), and who are principally bound together by relationships of affect, loyalty, common values and goals (Brint 2001: 8). For the purposes of our analysis, the concept of community is coupled with the notion of formal organisations. We use it to refer to networks of people living in a particular location and working towards a common goal. In our case, towards the goal of bettering the social services available to residents in their local areas. This broad definition fits with the literature on community development.

American researchers Rhonda Phillips and Robert Pittman (2009: 6) see community development as both a process of enhancing collective action and as an outcome which results in the improvement of a community, whether it be in regards to its environment, social activities, political engagement or economic outcomes. Community development projects attempt to involve the participation of stakeholders, including mobilising and organising ordinary residents, businesses and government groups (Grant 2001: 978). This process involves several stages, such as organising a core planning team and scoping for participants; developing a vision and purpose; conducting an assessment of the environment or issue of interest; proposing strategies for a desired outcome; long- and short-term implementation of projects, programs and activities; and drafting, monitoring and evaluating efforts (Murphy and Cunningham 2003: 162). The end goal of a community development project may be to bolster the self-sufficiency and life chances of a particular group; to improve a town’s economic trading, such as by improving the associations between local businesses; galvanising residents’ input and participation in housing policy and planning; petitioning for better city services; increasing community dialogue by publishing a community newsletter or hosting public meetings; staging a festival to promote cultural harmony; and addressing civic violence or crime issues (Murphy and Cunningham 2003: 163-166).

The literature referring to community development is largely focused on ‘communities of place’, that is, local neighbourhood groups living in particular geographies, often in urban or rural localities. In contrast, ‘communities of interest’ refer to socially defined groups who are not necessarily geographically located, such as online groups (Green and Haines 2002: 4; Phillips and Pittman 2009: 3) Rather than drawing on static notions of community, communities of place encompass groups which cut across various forms of interaction, including social services, economic development, recreation and public safety. The focus is on mobilising four elements of local interaction: locality, social norms, collective actions and a mutual identity (Bridger and Alter 2006: 14).
‘Place-based’ community development approaches are often necessary when it comes to disadvantaged or ‘hard-to-reach’ groups, such as migrants living in low income areas and who may have difficulties accessing services and infrastructure due to language or economic problems. In this case, focusing on a particular geographic community facilitates learning about how different organisations function, how they are associated, and their visibility among the people to whom they are trying to deliver services. This knowledge is essential in social planning by local governments (Sheil et al. 2008: 15).

There are various community development projects and networks around Australia (FaHCSIA 2009), for example, the Australian Centre for Community Services Research works with community service groups by providing research, design and evaluation of local programs. This includes working with the Kilburn and Blair Athol Community Action Group (2009), based 10 minutes north of Adelaide’s CBD. The group hosts the ‘Chicago Fair’, a free annual event which brings together Adelaide’s new migrant communities through entertainment activities and health screenings, and which aims to promote local groups and associations. It also provides English language classes, community lunches, crèches, computer classes and other lifestyle programs.

The present report is focused on community development with regard to the provision and organisation of social services for new Muslim migrants, including welfare, language support, education, employment and financial assistance, as well as other forms of social support necessary for a less bumpy resettlement experience, such as social activities that build up migrants’ social networks.

Research suggests that culturally specific support services are critical in easing the anxiety of migrant resettlement, particularly for migrants who may not yet have the language and cultural proficiency required to negotiate bureaucratic, mainstream services (Colic-Peisker and Walker 2003; Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2003). New South Wales social policy researchers, Pooja Sawrikar and Ilan Katz (2008), have identified three broad ‘barriers’ that limit some migrants’ ability to access mainstream social services: cultural, structural and service-related. First, cultural barriers relate to language issues, including poor English language proficiency and the professional jargon used by service providers which is alienating to new migrants. They might also stem from gender roles, such as norms which discourage individuals from seeking aid outside the family, particularly for women and children who have been taught to rely on their families as their main source of support, but also for some men who may have trouble discussing family problems because they see child-rearing issues as strictly the domain of mothers (2008: 6-7). Cultural barriers can also manifest as a fear and mistrust of authorities, including the police, immigration and housing agencies, especially for refugees who may have experienced persecution by officials within their former countries.

Sawrikar and Katz (2008: 7) see that structural barriers encompass problems that migrants face in not being able to physically access services, particularly for low income and remote residents for whom services are not easily accessible via public transport, or where the hours of operation do not suit the clientele. Insufficient knowledge about available services also falls under structural issues. As well as making the translation of information available in different languages, clients also
need to feel confident that the services they access will be sensitive of their cultural and linguistic requirements.

Sawrikar and Katz (2008: 8-10) also identify *service-related barriers* as the perception held by new migrants that some social services are culturally inappropriate, particularly due to the ways in which some services are marketed. ‘Individualistic’ models of counselling might be seen to implicitly impose conformity to mainstream Australian culture, and this may be off-putting. For example, programs which encourage children’s emotional independence may conflict with some migrants’ cultural and religious beliefs. The clientele need to see concrete examples that social services are not simply imposing Anglo-Celtic values upon their families, and that they will not be stereotyped or judged by the service providers. Offering the option to receive a service by a practitioner who shares their cultural background might be one way around these barriers. The other structural, service and cultural issues require further attention, particularly by mainstream institutions, such as government agencies.

Below, we discuss the theoretical writing on social capital, which allows us to think more deeply about the barriers and power issues in service delivery and community development initiatives.

### 2.1 Social capital

Social capital is put forward as an important concept for Australian social policy due to its perceived benefits in bolstering health, happiness and mental wellbeing, public safety and economic performance (Johnson, Headey and Jensen 2005: 30-35). It has been consistently linked to successful community development programs and service delivery initiatives (Burnett 2006; Grant 2001; Kilpatrick, Field and Falk 2003; Mathie and Cunningham 2003; Meredyth et al. 2002; Silverman 2001; Torezani, Colic-Peisker and Fozdar 2008; Wakefield and Poland 2005). Given its prominence in the literature, the concept of social capital is adopted as a starting point from which to critically discuss the resources and service delivery of Muslim community organisations in South Australia. The following section discusses theories, applications and measurements of social capital and presents our definition of this concept which is used to guide our analysis.

Prominent social theorist, Pierre Bourdieu (1973, 1977, 1985), sees that wealth is established via cultural practices and social institutions which privilege elite groups. Bourdieu (1973) argues that economic power is established via material, symbolic, cultural and social means. *Material capital* encompasses the (more or less) tangible forms of capital, such as monetary and other market transactions, including ownership of physical goods and land, and access to technology. It stands in contrast to *symbolic capital*, which Bourdieu uses to refer to the social value that a culture places on particular goods, ideas and activities (1973: 73). For example, titles, such as that of ‘professional’, yield certain profits, such as social prestige and authority, because they signify ‘assets that cannot be obtained directly with money’ (1985: 733). In connection, Bourdieu refers to *cultural capital* as the types of knowledge which enable and sustain the reproduction of power relationships (1973: 71). His focus was on the role of the education system in ensuring that the transmission of wealth and power remains with elite groups. Not having access to the right forms of knowledge, training and experience impedes the ability to achieve upward social mobility.
Finally, Bourdieu describes social capital as the ‘capital of social relationships’, particularly through family relationships (1973: 93, 97). It encompasses the types of relations which determine how different social actors access socio-economic power (1977: 184). Economic transactions, the accumulation of wealth and the maintenance of social status are all social processes that are dependent upon the knowledge, resources and power harnessed from people’s social ties. James Coleman builds upon this concept to study the ‘productive’ aspects of social action and social structures (Coleman J.S. 1988: 98). While he sees individuals as essentially guided by notions of self-interest, Coleman also identifies that certain types of collective activities and social relations facilitate economic transactions and other forms of social organisation. In particular, social norms and sanctions, including social support, status, honour and other social rewards, strengthen relationships and ensure that people do not always act solely out of self-interest, but also in the interests of a wider collective, such as their family and community (Coleman J.S. 1988: 104-105). Social capital is therefore a ‘less tangible’ form of social action, but one which is pivotal to the creation of human capital (Coleman J.S. 1988: 100).

Anirudh Krishna (2000) has further distinguished between two distinct but interrelated forms of social capital: institutional and relational. Institutional social capital focuses on the social structures and procedures which facilitate the flow and stability of collective action in a way that is mutually beneficial, such as through roles, rules and organisations. Relational social capital refers to the cognitive aspects of collective action, including the values, attitudes, norms and beliefs that motivate people to cooperate with others (2000: 77). Krishna argues that these two forms of social capital are ideal types and that they are most likely to be mixed up in various configurations in real life.

Institutional applications of social capital focus on notions of civic trust and participation at the societal level (Betts 1998; Cox 1995, 2005; Fukuyama 2002). A key example of this approach is Robert Putnam’s (2000) work on the decline of Americans’ membership in formal organisations, including (what he sees as) their disengagement in collective forms of leisure activities and neighbourhood groups. Putnam pays special attention to the declining role of religion in everyday life, changes to workplace connections, and a low feeling of trust among Americans. He sees modern American society as being characterised by depleted civic values and civic engagement. He argues that the utility of the concept of social capital is that it may be used to call attention to the altruistic ways in which people help others, such as through volunteering and philanthropy.

In contrast, relational concepts of social capital focus on the power of social networks at the group level, rather than as the property of societies (Burt 2000; Stone 2001: 6) For example, Nan Lin (1999a, 1999b) sees social capital as the ‘investment in social relations with expected returns’ (1999a: 30). In this view, social ties between individuals are formed on the basis of the instrumental and social rewards that may flow on from their mutual association. Social capital therefore describes the ‘assets’ that might be called upon through social networks. Lin sees four major sets of assets that might be enacted through relationships with people outside the primordial group (family and close everyday relations): having better and more varied access to the flow of information; exerting influence on other people’s decision making or calling upon other people’s social power by having them ‘put in a good word’ on someone else’s behalf; strengthening an individual’s social credentials by drawing on the resources of another person or organisation; and the reinforcement of identity, which
refers to the social recognition, emotional support and public entitlement to certain resources (1999a: 31).

As there are various uses of the concept of social capital, there is no standardised way in which it might be measured. Generally, surveys include multiple quantitative measures focusing on social activities and attitudes. This includes acts of volunteering, trust in different social groups and institutions, and frequency of sociability with family, friends and neighbours (for example, Narayan and Cassidy 2001: 67). Wendy Stone (2001: 5) notes that many studies measure the outcomes of social capital as its indicators, and this is probably not a good measure:

A measure of a norm of trust (for example the extent to which a culture within a family group is trusting) is different from a behavioural outcome of that norm (for example the extent to which family members trust one another to care for one another’s children).

Measuring social capital is therefore ‘tricky business’ because the underpinning notions (trust, altruism, togetherness and so on) are social constructs that are subjective and thus likely to be interpreted differently by different individuals (Narayan and Cassidy 2001:61). Given its varied meanings, there is strong criticism of the application and measurement of social capital. In particular, Alejandro Portes identifies that several problems arise when it is seen as the structural property of cities and nations. He sees that this concept is more usefully applied to the social actions of individuals and their networks, as Bourdieu and Coleman intended (1998: 21). In particular, he sees that the relational approach might help researchers to avoid celebrating their subjective ideals of ‘good’ community values and the condemnation of others.

Despite the problems associated with the application of social capital, this concept provides a way to think about the importance of social networks in fostering opportunities for material and non-material gains through social ties. We take the view that social networks are structured in ways which reproduce certain patterns of economic development (c.f. Woolcock 1998). Consequently, our report focuses on a relational notion of social capital, but we are not interested in measuring it in some statistical way. Instead, we are interested in applying this concept as a framework to qualitatively explore the ways in which social networks are structured to assist and restrict the flow of economic capital, via symbolic and material means.

James DeFilippis (2001) has made this case explicit with relation to the community development literature. He sees that this body of literature draws largely on Putnam’s institutional applications of social capital, and that the implications of this research are not very useful in terms of economic development. On the one hand, DeFilippis reports that community development studies continue to find that people living in poor, inner city neighbourhoods in America have high degrees of trust, volunteering, loyalty, attachment and civic pride. In the Putnam sense, poor communities might be seen to have a high degree of social capital (even though Putnam claimed that civic participation is waning, empirical data show the opposite). On the other hand, these communities stay poor, even when community development initiatives have been in place for decades, such as in the proliferation of community development corporations around America since the 1960s (2001: 797-798). He sees that poorer communities lack social capital in the Bourdieu sense – they lack access to power and economic capital through their social networks. Wealthier
and more powerful groups have greater control over their relationships or lack of connections. For example, gated communities reproduce their wealth by social isolation (2001: 790). He writes: ‘yuppies network precisely to get ahead of everyone else’ (2001: 793). In poorer suburbs, social connections might run deep, but they limit residents’ social mobility, simply because the networks have poor access to power and resources. DeFilippis argues that social capital is not a win-win game, nor is it simply a zero-sum: ‘To have any value as a term, social capital must retain a connection to economic capital, and it must therefore be premised on the ability of certain people to realise it at the expense of others’ (2001: 793).

Of particular interest to this report are three relational forms of social capital — linking, bridging and bonding social capital — and how these might be applied in practical ways in order to strengthen community development.

Simon Szreter and Michael Woolcock (2004) have been key figures in identifying linking social ties as a separate feature of social networks. They define linking social capital as the ‘norms of respect and networks of trusting relationships between people who are interacting across explicit, formal or institutionalised power or authority gradients in society’. This refers to vertical social ties to representatives of formal institutions, such as bankers, police, social workers, health practitioners and other professionals and people of authority who provide public and private service delivery on an ongoing, discretionary, face-to-face and needs-basis (2004: 655). It might also be used to study the collaboration of various groups and stakeholders, such as businesses and public organisations who provide funding and other resources in order to execute specific community projects, such as improving neighbourhood landscapes (Burnett 2006: 291; Kilpatrick, Field and Falk 2003: 424). In short, linking social capital refers to ‘friends in high places’; in the case of migrants, it refers to cross-cultural social networks, such as large mosques that serve as a ‘cross-cultural meeting place’ for Muslim migrants and their surrounding businesses (Pieterse 2003: 36, 46). Given its focus on hierarchical social relations, linking social capital necessarily involves the negotiation of power in a way that is perhaps more explicit in comparison to other social capital ties. For example, it has been used to study the resources, information and job-hunting support needed by refugees who utilise employment service providers contracted by the government, and the problems that arise because these providers do not recognise refugees’ skills and education (Torezani, Colic-Peisker and Fozdar 2008).

Bridging social capital is usually connected to ‘the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively’ (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 226). It refers to the informal acquaintances between diverse groups who are characterised by irregular contact, such as former work colleagues or fellow students. These ties are therefore seen as ‘weak’ or casual (Putnam 2000: 22-24). Weak relations are seen to facilitate the acquisition of external resources and information by forging relationships with people in different social networks who have access to different resources not available in an individual’s immediate social circle (Granovetter 1973). Bridging ties are usually established between associates and colleagues who more or less share similar socio-economic characteristics (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 10). They are most often related to status attainment, social mobility and acquisition of external assets, and so are seen as being essential in ‘getting ahead’ in life (Putnam 2000: 23; see also Lin 1999b). Bridging social capital receives strong consideration in the community development literature, particularly with respect to the levels of collaboration, referrals, resource exchange, information sharing and cooperation.
between community organisations. In this sense, bridging ties are seen to be central to building coalitions that collaborate towards sustained economic reform for local communities (Mathie and Cunningham 2003: 480).

Bonding social capital can be described as the relationships between homogenous groups, such as close friends, family or social clubs, such as ethnic-fraternal organisations (Putnam 2000: 22-23). These relationships result in strong, exclusive, and cohesive ties that facilitate a sense of solidarity among members of a group, and provide ongoing emotional and functional support to members (Schmid 2000). In relation to community development, bonding social capital nurtures the feelings of reciprocity which are necessary to the maintenance of community groups (Kilpatrick, Field and Falk 2003). Bonding links within community groups also facilitate the creation of group norms (Wakefield and Poland 2005). Bonding social capital is often seen to be very important to the functioning of individuals and families, but it might be seen to have a negative impact on community development when these close ties are fostered at the expense of external ties with other community groups or members (see also Hopkins 2002: 6; Mitchell and LaGory 2002: 203-204; Portes 1998: 13-18; Wakefield and Poland 2005). Among migrants, bonding social capital might restrict interaction with mainstream groups (Giorgas 2000: 11-12). Bridging and bonding social capital are seen as distinct but often interdependent (Putnam 2000: 23-24). Michael Woolcock and Deepa Narayan (2000) provide examples from the literature on poverty which shows this connection. Poor people can have high levels of bonding social capital if they are surrounded by a close-knit circle of family and friends who help them to ‘get by’ when they fall on hard times, but they may not have sufficient bridging capital with people who are better off, meaning that it is harder for them to ‘get ahead’ (2000: 227).

Religious organisations are seen as a source of ‘good’ social capital, although studies tend to focus on its institutional meaning. Such organisations have been progressive in the provision of social services throughout Australia’s history, including in social justice, welfare and philanthropic ventures, as well as by providing international relief and aid missions overseas (Cahill et. al. 2004: 113, 117). They seem to be experiencing a declining role in some forms of social capital, namely, because they are no longer an epicentre of social activity among young people as they once were (Bouma 2006: 78, 127). While certain forms of religious participation might be waning, researchers still see that religious organisations continue to provide high levels of social capital, by providing emotional assistance, companionship, comfort, community belonging, and by encouraging volunteering and sociability (Alexander 2007; Coleman J.A. 1998: 156-158; Greeley 1997; King and Furrow 2004; Sherkat and Ellison 1999: 373-374; Smith 2001: 140-142; Wuthnow 2002). These studies draw largely on Putnam and, in one case, a modified version of Coleman’s work, but they do not really examine the power dynamics and economic differences within religious organisations and their associated networks.

Studies identify that Muslim groups could use more social capital – again, because they work with an institutional definition, focusing on civic values and participation. A business academic from Brunei, Abul Hassan Farooqi, argues that Islamic concepts of wellbeing, brotherhood and socio-economic justice might be used in community development projects: ‘Islamic social capital is the networking that helps to create the linkages which in turn motivate people to follow up the Islamic conventions and norms governing the development process’ (2006: 115). Farooqi argues that networks which utilise Islamic social capital share the ‘ground rules for transparent
functioning’ (2006: 124). For example, he sees that by utilising Islamic social capital, trust and cooperative social action between banks and community development organisations might be facilitated (2006: 116). While this conceptualisation demonstrates the positive values that might motivate social exchange, Islamic norms of social justice duties are presumed to preclude any power issues that might arise. Islamic values certainly encourage civic participation and social welfare among Australian Muslims (Tolsma 2008). As with all religious communities, however, some members, notably religious leaders, who are always older men, have more status and power than others. This is just as much a problem for Muslim organisations as it is for all other social networks. In Britain, the 7/7 terrorist attacks led one academic to argue that the religious leaders of the British Pakistani community have ‘little or no public and civic role’ (Lewis 2006: 279). Instead, he sees that younger British-educated men might act as bridging capital pioneers by opening up the ‘relatively closed world of the mosque and Muslim community enclave’ and taking up more of a visible role of public leadership (Lewis 2006: 280). Again in this case, civic participation is seen as a good means to an end, without considering how power hierarchies might limit the networking privileges of some categories of people over others, in this case, highly educated male religious leaders.

More broadly, the negative consequences of social capital relate to the social control and collective sanctions enforced by social networks, resulting in social exclusion of outsiders, nepotism, conflict and limited opportunities for economic expansion among poor ethnic minorities (Portes 1998: 15-18; Putnam 2007; Streeten 2002: 11-13). Portes (1998: 15-18) discusses four issues in particular. First is the exclusion of outsiders, which can be detrimental in economic exchanges – if people only ever trade resources with people they know well, and they are reticent to trust others, they limit their opportunities and enterprise. Second, insular groups sometimes make excessive claims of their members, exhausting their resources and assistance, such as when looking for work or for loans. Third, because social capital is centrally concerned with the norms and social interaction of networks, there is a certain degree of conformity expected, meaning that communities sometimes place heavy restrictions on individual freedom. This might result in reproducing particular socio-economic outcomes among group members, such as evidenced in the average school grades of particular migrant groups. Finally, ‘downward levelling’ refers to the inhibition of individual freedom and success, which can sometimes be seen as threatening to collective cohesion. This is especially the case for groups who have experienced hardship and opposition by mainstream society, who come to hold dear a common story of adversity.

The following discusses how community development programs might be managed in a more equitable way, by the active management of power and collective resources.

2.2 Asset-based community development (ABCD)

The following section discusses the community development literature advocating that grassroots social networks should be principally included in the creation of community development programs, by mobilising local organisations’ social capital assets. Currently, mainstream delivery of social services which aim to target Muslim migrants demonstrates a needs-based community development approach. This term describes how well-meaning government groups, universities or other external agencies develop a program to address a community need, often in conjunction with
external ‘experts’ (Mathie and Cunningham 2003: 475). Needs-driven intervention programs are informed by traditional social science models, rather than by applied sociological models that privilege the role of community groups or clients (Anderson 1980). Policy researchers John Kretzmann and John McKnight (1993) warn that starting out from a needs-based, top-down approach alienates and disempowers the very communities that might benefit from social change. This approach limits the long-term planning and resilience of community programs. Given that the concept of social capital is essentially about the reproduction of economic power through social networks, a short-term, needs-based approach is not useful in achieving social transformation in the long run.

Grassroots social intervention approaches build on the positive aspects of a community. This is considered particularly important for groups who have been continually defined by negative issues (Mathie and Cunningham 2003; see also Atkinson and Willis 2005: 3). This is arguably the case for Muslim-Australian communities, especially due to negative stereotypes and press coverage which create a sense of social exclusion (Brasted 2001; Humphrey 2005; Kabir 2007, 2008; Poynting and Mason 2006; Yasmeen 2008). Asset-based community development (ABCD) stands in contrast with traditional ‘needs-driven’ community development approaches because it focuses on what assets a community has, rather than what resources it does not possess (Green and Haines 2002; Kelly and Caputo 2005; Kretzmann and McKnight 1993). ABCD represents a ‘bottom-up’ approach. It leaves the decision making and the practical community development run principally by community members who are already involved in running groups and services. This approach has some fusion with ‘community capacity building’. Australian researchers, Rowland Atkinson and Paul Willis, write: ‘it is not simply the development of these facilities that is important but also the linked outcomes of pride, [the] key skills and the capacity of communities to become more supportive and social spaces in their own right’ (2005: 3).

There is no specific formula for the development of an ABCD approach because, by nature, it is a highly context-dependant process. While there is no set guideline, there are some central strategies (Mathie and Cunningham 2003: 477; Kretzmann and McKnight 1996: 20). These include:

• Mapping and evaluating community ‘success stories’;
• Identifying the social and material resources of the individual groups (skills, funds, buildings and other assets);
• Setting up a core group of organisers;
• Building connections between community groups;
• Trading resources and support from outside the community;
• Developing strategies to take advantage of the strengths and interests of all participants and stakeholders,

Setting up an asset-based community development corporation (CDC) is one way of managing the assets of economically disadvantaged local community groups (Berger and Kasper 1993; Stoutland 1999). CDCs involve setting up a collective group which builds upon the strengths and interests of existing groups in order to serve a broader common purpose (Kretzmann and McKnight 1996: 19). Such community corporations have been a key feature in urban planning for decades, particularly in providing affordable housing in low income neighbourhoods, most prominently in the USA (Bratt and Rohe 2007; Gittel and Vidal 1998: 34-35; Glickman and Servon 1998: 501-502; Green and Haines 2002: 113-138). A CDC is one way to formalise the
network ties between several community development projects, by helping them become ‘more systematic and efficient’, strategic, professional and to accumulate further resources with outside collaborators who have higher economic, human and social capital, especially governments (Gittell and Vidal 1998: 36-37; Kretzmann and McKnight 1996: 20; Nye and Glickman 2000: 195). Stakeholders are important because they can provide investment in terms of financial assistance, but also through other collaborations, such as with not-for-profit organisations and universities that might help to acquire or repair community spaces, or by providing training and technical assistance to individuals as a long-term investment in their communities’ sustainability (Nye and Schramm 1999: 37-53). To this end, CDCs stand as an ideal way to get around the negative and limited opportunities of social capital, because they are set up to produce equitable trading and development, and they are also accountable to the public (Streeten 2002: 14).

American urban planning academics, Norman Glickman and Lisa Servon (1998), identify that although CDCs are not-for-profit groups, they need to actively build up and leverage five ‘capacities’ through their networks: resources, organisational, pragmatic, network and political. Resources capacity refers to the ability to maintain funding in order to meet long-term objectives; this includes generating grants, contracts, or loans (1998: 503). Organisational capacity refers to actively managing the structure of a CDC, by strengthening the skills and training of staff. This is a good way of growing the number of participants and volunteers involved in community development programs (1998: 503). Pragmatic capacity describes a CDC’s ongoing need to measure the types of services and resources it offers, as well as identifying new enterprises (1998: 504). This might include assisting small businesses, encouraging leadership development within local communities, and organising educational and cultural activities. Equally, the CDC might support building community housing, or referring local residents to job training programs (1998: 519). These external activities might be seen as important commercial ventures that increase the collective economic capital of residents. Network capacity refers to strengthening links with mainstream institutions, inside and outside of their community, especially private industry, political leaders, educational organisations and philanthropic agents (1998: 504). Political capacity refers to mobilising political action, advocacy and support, particularly by engaging decision makers who shape social policies that affect the community that the CDC is serving (1998: 504).

Social capital is a key component to building an asset-based CDC (Gittell and Vidal 1998: 33-56). An asset-based CDC involves community groups tapping into valuable external resources (linking social capital), forging relationships between different groups and sections of the community (bridging social capital), and pulling together to audit their resources and share past successes (bonding social capital). These three manifestations of social capital facilitate the associations, efforts and strategies of various groups in order to increase the economic development of their neighbourhoods. Negotiating norms and power relationships are important considerations that would need to be explicitly planned for, discussed and continually evaluated. We are not simply thinking about creating more links between Muslim groups, but we are also interested in exploring the reproduction of inequitable economic and power relations among Muslim networks and beyond, and how these issues might be managed. The next section outlines some of the economic and social capital considerations of Australian Muslim communities.
3. Economic and social capital of Australian Muslim communities

This section explores the issue of service provision and community development initiatives that attempt to address the economic and settlement needs of Muslim communities in Australia via a social capital framework. First, we look to the socio-economic demographics of Australian Muslims.

Muslims make up a small but significant, and much talked about, religious group in Australia. One issue of particular interest to social researchers and policy makers is the socio-economic marginalisation of Muslims in Australia. A study by Katharine Betts and Earnest Healy (2006) presents compelling statistical evidence regarding the economic disadvantage among second-generation Lebanese-Australians. Using an analysis of data from the 2001 Census, they show that Lebanese-Muslim households in Sydney are more likely to be poor, less formally educated and unemployed compared to all other households, including Lebanese-Christian households living in the same suburbs. In another study, Nahid Kabir (2007) also finds that economic disadvantage was particularly problematic for Australian Muslims in comparison to other groups. She reports that, in 2001, the national unemployment rate was 6.8% (2007: 1290). While the unemployment rates of other migrant groups at that time were closer to the national average, they were lower for some groups, such as 5.7% among British-born and Irish-born migrants. The unemployment rate of Muslims was 18.5%, almost three times the national average (2007: 1290). This is in spite of the comparable levels of education and vocational skills among Australians of Muslim, UK and Irish backgrounds (2007: 1290).

Riaz Hassan’s analysis of 2006 Census data identifies that the biggest Muslim groups were born in Australia (38% of all Muslims), Lebanon (9%), Turkey (7%), Afghanistan (5%), Pakistan (4%), Bangladesh (4%), Iraq (3%), Bosnia-Herzegovina (2%), and smaller proportions came from Iran, Fiji and India. He also finds that around 40% of Australian Muslims are younger than 20 years, compared to 27% of non-Muslims: ‘Their age structure suggests that as a human resource, Australian Muslims are concentrated in the more economically productive years of their lifecycle’ (2009: 5). Hassan’s analysis also positions Muslims as having comparable levels of educational attainment in comparison to non-Muslims, and Muslim men in particular as having a significantly higher rate of university qualifications (2009: 6-7). Despite this educational trend, Muslims have lower rates of home ownership, household income and employment in professional occupations, and higher rates of unemployment (2009: 7-9). Hassan reports that 40% of Muslim children live in poverty, which he defines as living on a weekly household income of less than $650, which corresponds to 60% less than the average weekly male wage in 2006 (2009: 8). This means that Muslim children are twice as likely to be living in poverty than those in non-Muslim households (2009: 8).

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS 2006a) finds that South Australians are relatively wealthy and that they have high rates of social capital in comparison to other states. They have among the highest proportions of people who feel able to ask others for small favours, high rates of personal donations to a community group, and higher rates in caring for aging and disabled people, which probably reflects the fact that South Australia has an older age structure than other states (2006a: 29, 37, 61,
This is in contrast to other Census data which seem to suggest that Muslim groups in South Australia face significant socio-economic disadvantages.

The following statistics are drawn from privately held customised datasets procured from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS data held by the second author). The data are presented as contextual information for the study on Muslim organisations in South Australia, and the findings will be connected back to the broader literature on community development. According to the 2006 Census, almost 1.5 million people live in South Australia; of these, around 10,500 nominate their religion as Islam. This corresponds to 0.7% of all South Australian residents. In comparison, there are over 897,300 Christians in South Australia (60% of all SA residents). Around 402,400 South Australians are not Christian (27%), including Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, people who state they have no religion, as well as those belonging to various other spiritualities, such as Indigenous Australian religions, Sikhism and Wicca. A further 189,500 people inadequately stated, did not further define or did not state their religion (13%) (this category, including incomplete responses, is henceforth referred to as ‘Not Stated’). The largest ancestry groups in South Australia who identify as Muslim are 1,300 Afghan people (12.6% of SA Muslims) and over 800 people who identify as Bosnian (7.8%). Other Muslim groups are much smaller, ranging from 300 to 500 people (corresponding to around 6% to 4% of their ancestry group). These include Pakistani, Lebanese, Turkish, Indonesian, Iraqi, Sub-Saharan African, Malay, Indian, Iranian and Bengali. Only 5% of South Australians who nominate their ancestry as Australian are Muslim. See Table 1 for further detail about the ancestry composition of the four religious categories discussed.

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1 Due to the ABS perturbation and randomisation algorithms, the total populations presented in this report fluctuate slightly from one matrix to the next. The ABS introduces these algorithms to customised datasets in order to protect the confidentiality of responses. For further discussion, see ABS (2006b).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancestry</th>
<th>Muslim N=</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Christian N=</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Other Religions N=</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Not stated N=</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total N=</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Afghan</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,489</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australian</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>236,629</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>128,962</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44,176</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>410,340</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>563</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanese</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>1,751</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3,361</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesian</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan African</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4,856</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay</td>
<td>371</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>788</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1,834</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>5,171</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranian</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of ancestry</td>
<td>2,798</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>626,448</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>253,487</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81,597</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>964,330</td>
<td>64.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>26,156</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11,520</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>62,371</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>100,880</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10,545</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>897,327</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>402,438</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>189,466</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,499,776</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Customised dataset held by second author.
Note: Not stated includes all incomplete responses, such as not further defined.

Looking at the internal religious distribution within these ancestry groups shows that Australian, Lebanese and Sub-Saharan Africans in South Australia are predominantly Christian. People of Indian and Iranian ancestry identify with Other religions. Around half of those who claim Malay, Indonesian and Bosnian ancestries are Muslim (between 47% and 55%). Afghan, Pakistani, Turkish, Iraqi and Bengali ancestries are 75 to 94% Muslim. Only 0.1% of people who say their ancestry is Australian identify as Muslim. Figure 1 provides further information on the religious distribution of select ancestry categories in South Australia.

![Figure 1 Religious distribution within select ancestries in South Australia (%), 2006](source)

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Customised dataset held by second author.
Note: Not stated includes all incomplete responses, such as not further defined.
The vast majority of all Muslims in South Australia can be categorised as relatively recent arrivals. Only 7% report arriving in Australia before 1986 (754 people). Three-quarters of these are aged over 45 years (560 people). Around 62% of Muslims arrived only in the past two decades (6,500 people). The biggest group is aged between 25 and 34 years, inclusive of 1,700 people (26% of all Muslim arrivals after 1986). This is a pivotal stage when young people are beginning to enter the full-time employment sector. A further 23% of people aged under 15 also arrived after 1986 (1,240 people), and 19% arrived between the ages of 15 and 24 years (1,470 people). Only 27% of South Australian Muslims are Australian-born, most of whom are aged under 15 years (1,600 people, or 54.6%). The youthful age distribution of Muslims presents a range of educational, vocational training and settlement issues, given that English is not the first language for the vast proportion of them or their parents. These issues are pertinent to the themes of this report, and they will be explored further below. Table 2 offers further information on age and year of arrival.

Table 2 Age by year of arrival of Muslims in South Australia, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Arrived in Australia before 1986</th>
<th>Arrived 1986 or after</th>
<th>Born in Australia</th>
<th>Year of arrival not stated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under_15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,246</td>
<td>1,619</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>2,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>2,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>1,596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45_plus</td>
<td>561</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>754</td>
<td>6,533</td>
<td>2,858</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>10,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of total</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>62.1%</td>
<td>27.2%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Customised dataset held by second author.

The average unemployment rate for South Australian Muslims in 2006 was 5.4%, which was over twice the state average (2.5%). Almost 37% of Muslims were ‘not in the labour force’, compared to 27% of the general population. This category includes people over the age of 15 years who are retired or engaged solely in home duties. A further 28% were in the ‘not applicable’ category, comprised of people under the age of 15 years; this is 10% higher than the state average (18.7%). This finding reflects the youthful distribution of Muslims in Australia, as discussed above. Figure 2 represents these employment findings.
Forty-three percent of South Australian Muslims live in Adelaide’s less affluent western and southern municipalities, including Charles Sturt, West Torrens and Onkaparinga (identified in Table 3 as ‘Rest of Adelaide’). Another 32.7% live in the lower socio-economic northern suburbs, including Gawler, Playford, Port Adelaide-Enfield, Salisbury and Tea Tree Gully. Only 16.2% live in the more affluent eastern suburbs including inner Adelaide, Burnside, Campbelltown, Prospect, Unley and the Adelaide Hills. An even smaller proportion (8%) live in the ‘Rest of South Australia’ region, encompassing country and coastal regions such as Outer Adelaide (including the Barossa and Mt Lofty Ranges), the Yorke Peninsula, the Murray Lands, the South East (including Kingston and Mount Gambier), the Eyre Peninsula, and the northern regions (such as Whyalla, Pirie and the Flinders Ranges).

Almost 14% of all Muslim households earn less than $350 per week (around 1,500 people), in comparison to 9% of the rest of South Australian households (30,600 people). The biggest proportion in this low income bracket lived in the region Rest of Adelaide (6% of all Muslims, or around 700 people). This is twice the proportion of non-Muslims (3%) who live on less than $350 per week in this region. In fact, across the four regions studied, Muslims had double the proportion of people earning under $350. The biggest proportion of all Muslim households in South Australia live on a weekly income of $350 to $649 (2,400 people or 23% of all Muslims). This was one and a half times the rate of non-Muslims in this low income bracket (222,000 people or 14.9% of all non-Muslims). In comparison, the biggest proportion of all non-Muslims in South Australia earn over $1,400 per week (29.5% of all South Australian households). This was just over twice the rate of Muslims in this high income bracket (1,900 people or 18% of all Muslims). Table 3 provides more information on the household incomes of Muslim versus non-Muslim households as a proportion of each group.
These statistical trends seem to support the broader literature suggesting that Muslims are, by and large, economically disadvantaged around Australia. Several government-sponsored programs are attempting to revitalise the provision of social services in order to better address this marginalisation. This is particularly with the view of encouraging the social and economic inclusion of ‘new and emerging communities’. These communities are a key focus of the Government of South Australia in the *Multicultural Access and Equity Report*, issued by the South Australian Multicultural and Ethnic Affairs Commission (SAMEAC 2007). The report provided an audit of public departments in the state, and flagged a number of policy and planning issues that needed to be addressed (2007: 6-11). These include:

- Cultural awareness training across the public sector, as a means to provide culturally appropriate services;
- Improved collection of data pertaining to new and emerging communities, and a greater level of consultation with them, would help ensure that their needs can be properly addressed;
- Enhanced English language training, vocational and education training for new migrants;
- Addressing community harmony, including through consultation with diverse cultures in areas such as housing, health, aged care, justice, education, and improved services and programs, in order to lift the economic outcomes of new arrivals, including skilled migrants and refugees, through provision of better interpreting and translation services.

Some studies are beginning to identify that programs that focus on interfaith harmony and religious education are not very useful in strengthening social cohesion among Muslims and non-Muslims at the everyday level (Ho 2007; Wise and Ali 2008). Sociologists Amanda Wise and Jan Ali (2008) conducted a study of the top 20 municipalities which are home to the biggest concentration of Muslim residents around Australia. They interviewed both Muslim and non-Muslim residents. The Muslim participants report feeling ‘ignored’ by their local councils, and believe that local politicians ‘don’t make the effort’ to reach out and ‘advertise’ that they are prepared to listen and address Muslims’ concerns (2008: 80). They believe that neighbourhoods which have a strong Muslim presence are neglected by local councils, sometimes in overt ways, by allowing these areas to become ‘run down’, or in tacit ways resulting from a lack of knowledge about Islamic practices, for example, by not providing *halal food* at council events, or by effectively forcing Muslims to stay away from certain public facilities, such as parks which have barbecues (facilities which Muslims cannot use in case their *halal food* is contaminated by pork products), or by allowing dogs to run around without leashes (Islamic law forbids Muslims from coming into contact with dogs) (2008: 81).
Table 3 Household income of Muslims and non-Muslims as a proportion of total geographic region (%) for each group, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Less than $350</th>
<th>$350-$999</th>
<th>$1,000-$1,399</th>
<th>$1,400 and over</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Not stated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>Rest</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Adelaide</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Adelaide</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of Adelaide</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rest of SA</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Customised dataset held by second author.
Notes: Not applicable includes non-residential dwellings, such as offices and offshore shipping areas. Not stated includes all incomplete responses, such as not further defined.
Wise and Ali (2008) identify that experiences of racism discourage the Muslim-Australian participants from making links with non-Muslims, but the Anglo-Celtic participants are even less likely to want to mix with other cultural groups (2008: 94). Where intercultural community events are hosted by local councils, the Anglo-Celtic participants feel as if these events which ‘celebrate and appreciate diversity’ are ‘pushed down their throat’, and that such celebrations are ‘not going to achieve things’ (2008: 93). In some cases these activities further exacerbate hostility towards Muslims. The researchers find that everyday social interactions centred on secular activities, such as sport, volunteering and public socialising, do better to increase ‘interethnic social capital’, that is, bridging links between Muslims and non-Muslims, than seminars and events centred on religious education (2008: 66, 67, 143).

Having discussed the conceptual framework that underpins our analysis, we now describe the methodology of the pilot study. The ethnographic insights will be used to bring together the literature of ABCD and social capital into a practical agenda which builds upon the success and collaboration of Muslim community organisations around Adelaide.

4. Methodology

We will now reflect on the ethnographic approach of our pilot study. This is with the view of sharing some practical considerations that might assist future community members, practitioners and other stakeholders who wish to take up and grow our suggestions for an ABCD framework.

Ethnography involves the study of in-depth meanings, functions and consequences of human actions and institutions, in fairly small-scale settings, usually focusing on one particular group or context. Data are collected ‘in the field’, that is, in the local context of a particular group or organisation, and usually in relatively unstructured ways. Insights are generated from various sources, including documents, informal conversations and participant observation, where the researcher is involved in everyday activities and events of the group they are studying (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 3). The quality of the data is more important than the quantity. A small number of participants or case studies can provide important insights that might not be captured through other approaches, such as wide-scale surveys which count how many people hold a particular attitude about society, but which cannot measure the subjective reasons why they hold that view. The nature of ethnographic research is exploratory, meaning that sampling techniques or interview questions might change depending upon the social setting and the cues provided by the participants (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 4).

There are various criticisms of this approach. This includes the ways in which the researcher’s scientific training and personal views might impact on their interpretation of the data. Equally, meanings are fluid and so people’s subjectivities cannot always be directly measured by observation or through language (Hammersley and Atkinson: 2007: 10-14). In order to address the limitations of ethnographic methods, a researcher must be reflexive, that is, they must consciously and continually reflect upon the various aspects of the research process (Hammersley and Atkinson: 2007: 14-15). This includes the ways in which their own biography and socio-historical position affects the research questions they ask, as well as how they
collect, analyse and draw conclusions from their data. These issues will be addressed below with respect to the present study.

The data were collected between February and July 2008, in partial fulfilment of the first author’s (Lauren) Honours thesis (Tolsma 2008), and under the academic supervision of the second author. The fieldwork and interview material was subject to approval by the Ethics Committee of Swinburne University, and the raw data were securely stored, de-identified, transcribed, annotated and coded. The second author does not have access to the interview material, fieldwork notes, or real names of the participants and the organisations visited. The empirical insights presented in this report have not been previously documented. The thesis explored the formal and informal support networks of Muslims living in South Australia through ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative interview data. It only drew on one section of the qualitative data, pertaining to the subjective understandings of ‘Islamic values’, and how this impacted on the informal social networks of young first and second-generation Muslims. The present report extends on the previous research by focusing on the organisation of social capital by South Australian Muslim community groups, rather than on the identity issues of individuals.

The present report draws on a broader set of research questions from the Honours study which was not addressed in the thesis: what are the issues and benefits experienced by first- and second-generation Muslim-Australians in establishing and maintaining their social networks? What are the subjective benefits of existing networks? What issues are involved in attempting to build social capital through new social networks? The purpose of this report is to revisit the data yielded from these questions in order to study the social and material resources enacted by social networks at the community level, using the literature on community development.

Lauren began her fieldwork by surveying information sources in order to canvass the breadth and scope of organisations that publicise Muslims as their key membership base. She did this in order to identify as many groups as possible that she might be able to contact in order to find participants for her research. Using internet search engines, phone directories, the online directory of community groups for South Australia, and later snowballing from participant referrals, sixteen organisations from around South Australia are identified to be operating as Muslim community groups, including mosques, migrant support centres, education groups and social clubs. Getting in touch with them proved very difficult: three had disconnected phone numbers, one had no phone number listed, the contact numbers for two organisations were persistently unanswered (thus unreachable), and one had a voicemail service, but Lauren’s messages elicited no response. Furthermore, two groups who were publicly listed were no longer operational. Lauren also visited the organisations in person and found them difficult to locate upon arrival, as they are devoid of any obvious signs that the buildings are actually Islamic centres.

Lauren eventually managed to contact and hold face-to-face meetings with representatives from seven mosque-related and Muslim services groups, including two secretaries, one founding member, a settlement officer, a vice-president, a president and an Imam. Three of these representatives were men, and four were women. In order to protect their anonymity, the organisations that make up this study’s sample can only be broadly described: two were ethnic-based migrant support organisations; one might be described as a reference group (an organisation set up as a key point of contact for broader Australian institutions); one was a sect-
based Muslim organisation; one was a student university group; one was linked to a mosque; and the last was an educational group which supports Islamic scholarship. Handwritten notes were taken in lieu of voice recordings to maintain a casual approach, and also because some interviews were impromptu. The purposeful sample method was therefore also a sample of convenience, including only the groups who were accessible. This method is also a reflection of the difficulties experienced in contacting organisations around South Australia. The researcher attempted to capture some key quotes during informal interviews, as well as reflective notes directly following the conclusion of each interview. As the number of the Muslim groups interviewed is small, there is a risk that they may be identified if greater specificity is provided about the representatives’ background, their roles, and the functions and location of their organisation. For this reason, none of these groups will be named or linked to the types of services they provide, and the data pertaining to these interviews will be attributed to Muslim community ‘representatives’ rather than to a specific person or named group.

Five in-depth interviews were also conducted with ordinary members of the Muslim-Australian community in Adelaide. These people belong to Muslim and non-community organisations and they participate as volunteers, but they are not recognised as community leaders, and they do not fulfil a formal role of authority within the Muslim organisations to which they belong. All of these interviews were digitally recoded and transcribed verbatim. Two participants were recruited directly via promotional flyers which had been distributed by the Muslim community representatives who had already been interviewed. These flyers were pinned to the notice boards of three mosques in Adelaide. A further two participants were recruited personally at a Muslim community event that Lauren attended, and the final one through snowballing from another participant’s referral. The ordinary participants were all aged between twenty-one and twenty-nine years of age, in full- or part-time employment, and they were tertiary educated. Two were of Pakistani descent, two of Bosnian descent and one of Afghan descent. For confidentiality and ease of reference, these ordinary Muslim participants will often be referred to simply as ‘the participants’.

Further to these ‘representative’ and ‘participant’ interviews, Lauren attended two public seminars, two private commemoration evenings, and two workshops hosted by Muslim community groups and mosques around Adelaide. Field notes were recorded pertaining to event details, interactions with participants who attended, and the researcher’s reflections about the social dynamics witnessed and experienced. One of the public seminars, one of the workshops, and both of the private commemoration evenings were attended at the invitation of the study’s participants, while the other two events (one workshop and one seminar) were publicly advertised online, and found during the initial web searches for Muslim community groups.

Research considerations include the number and demographics of the organisations, representatives and ordinary members who make up the sample. The opportunistic sampling method led Lauren to participants and representatives who share some key demographics, particularly strong English language skills. This might be a limitation given that language is a considerable barrier to accessing support and community services (Sawrikar and Katz 2008). People with lower English language skills would have been ideal to include in a study such as this, but the ethnographer is not bilingual. Future community development initiatives that take up the framework of
this pilot study would need to accommodate the input of local residents and community workers who have lower English language skills, preferably carrying out their interactions in the community member’s primary language.

A similar critique applies to the representatives and ordinary participants interviewed, all of whom have the time and inclination to discuss their Muslim community organisations with an outsider. Other Muslim community groups may have representatives who lack the time, the desire or the English language confidence to oblige to such a meeting, and so are not represented in this report. Due to their involvement and ties to both Muslim organisations and other community groups, the sample of representatives and ordinary participants collectively signify civically engaged individuals with varying degrees of social capital. This is partly due to the nature of research, which focuses on Muslims who already belong to community organisations. Given this interest, it is unsurprising that studies of this nature are more likely to find participants who are civically engaged (for example McCue 2008; Wise and Ali 2008). This stands in contrast to other Muslims who, for various reasons, may be socially isolated and thus less civically engaged, and who are less visible and perhaps less trusting of outsiders. This may or may not include the groups who were contacted but did not return Lauren’s calls. These factors mean that the data cannot be considered to be characteristic of the broader Muslim community organisations in South Australia.

These points about the linguistic, time and civic connections of groups speak to an ongoing problem in social research: how to engage hard-to-reach, unwilling and disinterested participants. This is especially a class and gendered problem, with working-class men often seeing social research topics as mundane or not their business, or they are sometimes disengaged due to the methods used, as they may feel uncomfortable with discussing their experiences in one-on-one interviews (Pini 2005). Social scientists can use several strategies to try to get around the lack of involvement of certain groups, but it is not easy. This involves adopting the language and ideas of the participants in order to ‘sell’ the topic as having some perceived extrinsic benefit to them, reinforcing values that will make their participation attractive (for example, by appealing to their sense of masculinity or pride), and paying for their time (Butera 2006: 1276-1278). In this case, offering payment or some other form of resource exchange (in the spirit of the ABCD approach) might be one way of getting hard-to-reach organisations to become involved in future studies of this nature.

The individuals and groups involved in the research generously donated their time without any reward. Without discrediting or undervaluing their gift, it is useful to consider the social implications of their involvement. This brief (and speculative) discussion might help future studies that attempt to take this ABCD framework beyond the realm of possibility in a small study such as the present one. Speaking with great respect for the participants, they might be seen to have a vested interest in the research topic because, as their interviews will be shown to suggest, they actively seek to forge ‘bridging’ ties to other groups and to increase understanding of their communities by non-Muslims.

The ABCD framework depends upon the participation of clients and ordinary residents as well as community leaders and activists, so the issue remains: how to find a way to turn disengaged groups into stakeholders with a vested interest in community development projects. Volunteering skills, knowledge or training to
smaller, hard-to-reach organisations would enhance the community development process in two ways. On the one hand, this approach would facilitate their input; on the other hand, it would also enhance the organisation’s skills and resources. Getting participants involved in the research process also involves tapping into the concerns of community groups. This might be done by reframing the research topic and questions according to a community’s interests. This is difficult to achieve without preliminary consultation, and where hard-to-reach or disengaged groups are concerned, getting them to talk about what they do not want to talk about is a conundrum, but one that needs to be overcome. This might be less of an issue if the researcher/practitioner is positioned as an ‘insider’ to the group. Being seen as an insider does not necessarily mean that the researcher already has to be a member of a social group before its members will agree to participate in the research. In some cases, the researcher might establish rapport with their participants by virtue of certain shared social characteristics, or by playing up certain aspects of mutual common ground, or otherwise establishing their social credentials. For example, Jan Ali (2008) joined the Islamic religious movement of *Tablighi Jama‘at* in Sydney in order to study its religious practices. Establishing his credentials was not as problematic as it might have been for someone else. He is already a Muslim, but he did not belong to this sect. He was welcomed as a Muslim researcher who sought to learn more about Islam, but he still had to engage in an active management of his identity, his presentation of self and his everyday practices, by wearing special clothing, growing a beard and sleeping on the ground rather than a mattress (2008: 19). This takes commitment, but it also demonstrates that sometimes community work requires immersion and some serious give-and-take in order to gain the participation of hard-to-reach groups.

In connection, a key consideration is that both authors of this report are not Muslims, and by virtue of our academic training we, like the participants who represented their community organisations, have higher cultural and social capital than the new Muslim migrants who are the central focus of this report. The ethnographer who collected the data, Lauren, is a secular, Anglo-Australian woman. This positions her firmly as an outsider who might be interpreted as untrustworthy and unapproachable, or regarded as incapable of understanding the complexities of Muslim life in Australia. Lauren enacted various strategies to make herself more culturally and religiously sensitive towards the people with whom she interacted during community events and interviews. Her first priority was to educate herself about Islamic beliefs and practices. As well as reading books and articles, the ethnographic focus of her thesis provided a good context for this learning, as she participated in community events which aimed to educate non-Muslims about Islam. Lauren also actively managed the context of interaction during her interviews with both the Muslim community service representatives and the ordinary participants. In keeping with an ethnographic approach, she conducted the interviews in a casual manner, usually over coffee or lunch, and sometimes in the person’s home, or at the centre from which their group operates. In addition to the formal community events that Lauren participated in as part of her ethnography, she also attended informal social events and celebrations at the invitation of her interviewees. These are not included as part of the ethnographic study, but Lauren attended with the hopes of developing rapport with the participants in a more familiar and relaxed social setting. This informal opportunity for rapport is more difficult to establish during a formal interview context. Lastly, while Lauren had drawn up semi-fixed interview schedules for both the representative and participant interviews, she allowed the participants to steer the direction of the conversation to a large extent. This was with
the aim of facilitating the interviewee’s subjective understandings of their Muslim support networks and services. This flexible approach to the research process is faithful to the ethnographic tradition (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007: 4). Lauren also offered all her interviewees copies of their transcripts and of her completed thesis, and she attempted to elicit their feedback while she was completing her Honours thesis. While these strategies helped Lauren to manage the research process in a more reflexive and equitable way, the fact remains that both the authors have final authority over the report and its recommendations.

Given our status as outsiders, this report may serve as an aid to Muslim community development workers and their stakeholders, but it is not a ‘blueprint’ in itself. It is based on the voices and ideas of a few Muslims living and working in the central suburbs of Adelaide. The purpose of publishing the findings from this small, qualitative study is for members of Muslim groups to further develop the ideas represented in this report, to specify their contingencies and to give their community projects specific meaning with respect to their members’ experiences and skills.

4.1 Research questions for Muslim community development

Given our analysis of the literature on community development and social capital, we seek to use ethnographic insights in order to answer the following questions:

*What are the successful strategies that Muslim organisations use in order to meet the social and material needs of Muslim migrants in Adelaide? How might this knowledge and experience be harnessed in order to improve the settlement and socio-economic outcomes of Muslim migrants and the communities where they live? How might an asset-based community development approach assist in enhancing the resources, collaboration and participation of the various local groups, including organisations, stakeholders and residents?*

The report will use these questions to show that the ABCD approach promotes the centrality of Muslim communities in developing and evaluating the programs through which their social mobility might be facilitated. Despite the methodological limitations of the study, pertaining to the small sample size and the outsider status of the researchers, the ordinary participants and representatives speak about their concerns and idea about their communities, as educated and civically engaged Australian Muslims. The people and events that contributed to the outcomes of this study provide an overall picture of the social positioning of Muslims who have been mostly successful in achieving a religious life in a secular, multicultural state. The representatives in particular provide valuable insight into the perceived attributes, shortcomings, aspirations and institutional resources of local community organisations. While this report will go on to make a number of practical suggestions regarding an ABCD framework for South Australian Muslim communities, it is only a starting point that other community groups and stakeholders might build upon.

We now draw out the broad findings from the ethnographic study pertaining to Muslim community services. The concept of social capital will be used to identify the rich resources already available within the community groups studied. Rather than providing extensive empirical examples, the discussion focuses on the accumulated knowledge and applications of the fieldwork in order to formulate an ABCD approach which addresses issues of social capital, networks and power.
5. Social Capital Among South Australian Muslim Community Organisations

This section begins with an overview of the Muslim community support services that were identified during the course of the pilot study. We then provide some brief examples of the ethnographic data to demonstrate the importance of linking social capital and its relevance to community development. This will be followed by similar discussions on bridging and bonding social capital. Having reviewed the literature, we define social capital in the following way for the purposes of our analysis:

*Social capital refers to people’s capacity to draw upon social and material resources through their active participation in social networks, the norms that encourage collective social action, and the power relations that govern social exchanges.*

The initial fieldwork shows that there are a number of avenues through which Muslims might seek support in Adelaide. Through internet searches and word of mouth, the first author visited six mosques, two Islamic education groups, two ethnic-based groups, one sect-based group, one Muslim reference group and a women’s group. All three of Adelaide’s main universities also had Muslim student groups, although only one of them was officially registered as a student association at the time of the research. While the sample of this study includes only a section of the Muslim community groups around South Australia, the representatives who were interviewed describe a wide range of services that their organisations coordinate. The following is a list of the types of services provided by the seven Muslim groups included in this study’s sample. The groups will not be linked to the services they provide, to protect their anonymity. Generally, the groups provide a number of the following support services:

- Social events for members and their friends;
- Islamic awareness events for non-Muslims;
- Religious classes;
- Workshops/life skill classes;
- Halal food services;
- Libraries for lending religious texts;
- Informal counselling;
- English classes;
- Financial aid;
- Community events for cross-cultural interaction;
- Fundraising events for charity organisations;
- Women’s and youth support groups;
- Separate sports programs for women and men;
- Settlement support and practical assistance.

According to the organisation representatives interviewed, the primary aim of these programs is to target those individuals who are socially vulnerable or isolated, such as new migrants and refugees, although educating and interacting with non-Muslims is also a central objective of some programs. They facilitate information, practical support and friendship to new arrivals from overseas. There are various ways in which new arrivals can be referred to these community organisations, including through their primary Australian connections, such as family members, friends or ‘proposer’ (sponsor for a humanitarian visa), or through people from their local mosque. This emphasises the central role of social networks in helping people to find
out where to go for help; in these cases, a new migrant would need to know somebody who already knows of one of these groups. Additionally, new arrivals might seek out this information through their national embassy, not-for-profit organisations that assist in resettlement, or government agencies responsible for migration and settlement. Issues with this largely word of mouth referral system will be discussed later in the report, as they point to the strength of weak ties in accessing information and increasing the social capital of marginalised people (Granovetter 1973). Having sketched an outline of the Muslim community services and formal support networks available, the next section will examine how these might use links with other institutions and public agents in order to leverage their resources. We also discuss an initial suggestion for an ABCD corporation to help pool together the resources of grassroots groups; to engage the participation of stakeholders, including government and local residents; and to manage the inequitable distribution of power among existing social networks.

5.1 Linking social capital

Linking social capital refers to connections with ‘people in high places’, as well as with mainstream institutions, such as large, well-funded service providers. Strong levels of linking social capital are associated with the success of community-based initiatives (Mathie and Cunningham 2003; Grant 2001). This is because smaller groups are potentially able to access resources and support through larger and more powerful affiliates. The community development literature has suggested that hierarchical relationships are characterised by the manipulation of people with less power by people with more powerful social links (Grant 2001). This does not necessarily have to be the case, but power issues need to be explicitly managed. An ABCD approach can contribute to the empowerment of local communities by identifying ways to break down the segmented and hierarchical structures of social networks and by providing more egalitarian access to resources (Burnett 2006: 291). This is primarily achieved through multi-group community collaboration, information and resource exchange.

The ethnographic fieldwork identifies that the Muslim student associations in the three universities maintain good levels of communication. This is mainly a reflection of the external relationships between the members of these student committees, who are also involved in Muslim groups outside of their universities. This finding highlights the existence of a core group who participate in a variety of programs, groups and events around Adelaide. For this reason, these students might be seen as potential ‘social capital brokers’, given that they have good internal ties within their organisations and external ties to other groups (Kilpatrick, Field and Falk 2003: 427, 430). They are in a good position to diffuse information and garner resources for different programs and events. The members of these student organisations, however, are the exception.

The other Muslim community organisations have working relationships with other groups, but most of their collaboration was infrequent, and the idea of what constitutes collaboration is quite fluid. The larger community events encourage the greatest level of collaboration, mainly due to the costs and time involved. With such events, therefore, there seemed a clearer need to pool resources simply due to the size of the potential audience. The interviews with the community representatives identify that two of the larger Adelaide mosques have a long-standing relationship, sharing committee members and regularly organising community events together.
These mosques only occasionally collaborated with a third mosque, although not recently at the time of the interviews.

Aside from these mosque organisations, the representatives of two of the other community groups discussed having never collaborated with any other Muslim group, although one of them had an ongoing relationship with a migrant resource centre that did not specifically cater to Muslims. The idea of Muslim communities working together is seen as difficult to achieve, because it would require a lot of coordination that seems insurmountable given the uneven links and infrequent collaboration among Muslim organisations. One of the ordinary participants said: ‘[The] community is not working together or cooperating... I can see that there is a community... but [pause] on practical terms, on everyday terms, it’s not like that’.

This comment might suggest that there are inactive, ineffectual or less productive ties between Muslim organisations in Adelaide that might be better harnessed to assist service provision on a day-to-day level. It might also suggest that the notion of ‘the Muslim community’ pulling together is difficult to orchestrate without a shared vision, possibly due to differences among the sectarian and ethnic groups that this phrase describes. Other issues include the differing socio-economic status of Muslim communities in different areas around Adelaide, particularly between so-called ‘new and emerging communities’ (a vogue term for refugees) who may be living in lower socio-economic suburbs and longer-established migrants who may be living in more affluent areas.

The cultural, human and social capital among different groups of Muslim migrants might be first explained by the length of time they have spent in Australia; it might be reasonable to assume that newly arrived migrants require more external assistance than those who have been in Australia for more than a decade. At the same time, their differences in capital might better explained by the skills, vocational and educational credentials that they had achieved before entering the country. The statistical trends on Australia’s humanitarian entrants signify various issues regarding childhood development, education and vocational skills among different groups of Muslims. Cumulatively, these issues suggest that the differences among Muslim migrants set up class and power imbalances that are subsumed and rendered invisible by programs and initiatives which aim to assist ‘the Muslim community’. The organisations currently working with Muslim migrants provide an eclectic mix of services to clients from different backgrounds. They might better collaborate together, but there is currently insufficient common ground, time or resources to facilitate this process, especially given the differences within and across Muslim community groups around Adelaide.

During the fieldwork, community representatives talked at length about problems they faced in trying to access government grant schemes. One says that her group received regular grants, but that the process was difficult and time consuming, but she did not want to ‘complain’ because grants were the only way that the group is able to remain in operation. Their funding has decreased in recent times, however, and the group had to cut some of their support programs, including providing emergency loans for new migrants. One participant also discusses the problem that she saw with the grants scheme:

I’ve seen Muslim organisations over and over again who receive government funding for five years, and great! They are doing great. But all of a sudden the government says, ‘No more funding for this particular thing’, and the whole
organisation just falls apart because that’s the only thing they knew, was government funding. And once that’s cut, there’s nothing any more.

This comment suggests that the current grant schemes may not be an effective way to promote self-reliance or long-term development opportunities, given that the government funding is a short-term, and unreliable, source of income. The way in which grants are allocated might benefit from a reappraisal, given that smaller groups rely heavily on government funding. Currently, the grants support much-needed activities in an ad hoc way, but small community organisations might access funding resources to better effect. The next section will offer ideas about how to begin making this happen.

In this connection regarding external support, the power imbalances inherent in linking social capital ties need to be considered and explicitly addressed. One issue relates to the power inequality among Muslim community groups. The representative from a migrant support group says that there are some difficulties in garnering support from other, larger, community groups. She claimed that if the Imam (or another key leader) did not approve of a program, then they would not promote it, and the program would not receive much support or attendance from a broader cross-section of ordinary Muslims. Some of the ordinary participants also discussed the power dynamics that they see operating within the organisations to which they belong. One suggests that some religious leaders were ‘from the old school’ and found it hard to make allowances for new or different community initiatives to come to fruition. Another says that some are:

Just so [pauses] stubborn and old. And don’t understand what the community needs. And some people when they’re there for a long time, they forget the purpose or their [pause] function. So it becomes very politicised.

Another important aspect of linking social capital with relation to Muslim community groups is their links with different levels of government. Some maintained quite affable ties with local and state government representatives. One ethnic-based group in particular demonstrated a high level of familiarity with their local government representative, and with one state level representative. Both of these male politicians were billed as ‘special guests’ at one of the organisation’s commemoration evenings, where they gave speeches demonstrating the history of their affiliation with the organisation. In another example, one community representative says her group took advantage of a state election to petition their local candidate for an upgrade of their prayer facilities. They were successful in obtaining government support for this project, which in turn got them the funding to commence the much needed renovations.

Community development projects necessarily require the input, advocacy and support of more powerful political actors, particularly by engaging decision makers who shape social policies that affect the community (Glickman and Servon 1998: 504). Government agencies at all levels (local, state and federal) take a participatory role in many Muslim community events in South Australia, usually by attending large functions, giving keynote addresses and endorsing the petitions of the larger organisations to which they are affiliated. At the same time, if smaller community organisations are to prosper, they need to better nurture links with government officials at all levels, particularly in order to establish their credibility and to grow their resources (Glickman and Servon 1998: 527). Currently, all except two of the
Muslim community organisations studied do not have strong linking capital. It also seems as if the associations between the smaller and larger Muslim groups are characterised by power disequilibrium, even though these organisations do not necessarily see themselves as being in conflict. Power struggles exist even if they are not actively manifest as conflict, hostility or competition. The end result, however, is that smaller groups are not well positioned to establish linking ties to external groups, given that they do not actively manage the power relations with the larger community groups. This limits the types of resources they are able to draw upon and, in the long run, it does little to increase the economic and social development of the communities with whom they work.

Superimposing linking ties in this case would not be very effective – simply getting governments involved may not necessarily help the smaller community groups. Despite their best intentions, government workers and external practitioners are in a position of power, even when they mean to adopt a consensual and helpful approach (Wakefield and Poland 2005: 2826-2827). They might inadvertently take over the agendas of the smaller community groups, in an attempt to help them. Externally run, ‘top-down’ community programs are less effective in garnering local support, are less sustainable in the long run and do not really promote community empowerment (Kilpatrick, Field and Falk 2003; Mathie and Cunningham 2003). Government involvement in community development projects needs to be carefully and actively managed. The smaller community organisations need to grow their political capacity, not just by simply networking with external stakeholders, but also by growing their ‘organisational capacity’ (Glickman and Servon 1998: 516). This could be accomplished by involving their members in leadership and negotiation training and by coordinating their efforts with other smaller and larger community groups, so that they might navigate, grow and manage their linking ties together.

The next section will explore the bridging social capital held by South Australian Muslim communities, and how this can be supported through practical, bottom-up strategies.

5.2 Bridging social capital

Bridging social capital refers to weaker relationships between people and groups who are of more or less equal social standing (Putnam 2000: 22-24; Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 226). These relationships tend to be inclusive, diverse and orientated towards the acquisition of tangible assets, such as external information and resources. The most obvious way that bridging social capital relates to the Muslim community organisations sampled in this study is their central interest in bridging cultural and religious divides. In particular, all the groups wish to encourage non-Muslims to participate in their religious and cultural activities. The community organisation representatives talked about their aim to demonstrate that Muslims are ‘normal’ and like everyone else in Australia, and how they hope to weave themselves into the broader social fabric, by strengthening the visible contribution that Muslims make to the communities where they live. One mosque representative believes that one way to do this is through educating the wider public about Islam. To this end, his mosque hosts education evenings and provides speakers for schools and businesses. One of the ordinary participants echoes this sentiment, suggesting that mosques should have barbecues and invite the non-Muslims in the neighbourhood to come to mosque after Friday prayer. He suggests that this would be with a special emphasis on giving visitors information about the mosque and Muslims more
broadly. He also sees this as an opportunity for intercultural socialising, where people could meet each other and ‘show that they aren’t terrorists’. This comment exemplifies how the interviewees saw negative stereotypes of Muslims as a significant roadblock to stronger interaction with non-Muslims. Another participant also mentions having open days at her local mosque as a good start to intercultural understanding and interaction:

I think open mosque day would be great, you know, to start with. You know, just educating people about who Muslims are, and things like that. Maybe have Eid celebrations [festivals which mark significant Islamic occasions], [and] invite people to come!

She goes on to say, however, that open mosque days might be a ‘little bit out of date’, and so she also talks about organising events that Muslims and non-Muslims can do together that have less of a religious orientation. She discusses book clubs and environmental programs – activities which focus on shared interests, rather than religious difference. This is a useful suggestion, given that other studies have found that effective models for social cohesion encourage face-to-face interaction and socialising on the basis of secular activities and social similarities, rather than on religious education and difference (IDA 2007; Wise and Ali 2008).

As the initial fieldwork identifies, some mosques and prayer centres are not easily identified by the general public. As a non-Muslim, Lauren experienced a lot of trouble finding Islamic organisations, and upon arrival, the buildings did not really have sufficient signs which strongly advertised that they were Muslim centres. Additionally, there were no representatives available to greet any visitors. Lauren relied on mosque patrons to help her locate a mosque representative, and sometimes there was no-one available. This could discourage members of the public who, unlike the researcher, may not be willing to go to such lengths to have a chat with someone about Islamic organisations and the life of Muslims more generally.

The fieldwork identifies that many Muslim organisations lacked visibility in other ways. In general, Muslim community groups are difficult to locate through traditional channels, as many are not listed in the Yellow and White Pages or in online community phone directories. Many of the public listings in the current directories are no longer valid. Some are not publicly registered as organisations (religious, not-for profit, charity or otherwise), making them impossible to contact unless you know someone who knows a member of the committee. Not being registered or listed as an organisation also impedes the ability of these groups to apply for grants, or to be recognised and consulted in policy decision making that may affect local Muslim communities.

Another issue regarding the visibility of Muslim organisations regards marketing and promotion, something which is currently managed poorly and may be preventing stronger participation of non-Muslims in Muslim community events. Promotion for events is often done through mail-box leaflets, and through word of mouth. There are also some events which are advertised online, but these sites would only be consulted by people specifically browsing for Muslim community events. These concrete efforts to promote community events may simply not be reaching enough people. More troubling is the distinct lack of media interest. This is peculiar considering that there is generally some level of government representation at these events. While the media was quick to follow the South Australian Attorney-General’s
bicycle ride to a so-called ‘Nazi house’ in an Adelaide suburb (for example see ABC News 2008), there was a conspicuous lack of media interest in the five Muslim community events that he attended around the same time.

During the primary researcher’s participant observation at community events, the level of non-Muslim participation was quite low. The events which aimed to draw in non-Muslims primarily centred on religious education. Examples include two seminars held in central Adelaide at the beginning of 2008. The first was marketed as an Islamic arts event, and attracted a large number of academics and arts patrons. The other was a government-sponsored workshop on workplace diversity and discrimination which attracted a large number of service providers, such as teachers and social workers. These events seemed to be successful in encouraging people to think about the stereotypes they held about Muslims, but there was little opportunity for Muslim and non-Muslim attendees to interact socially.

One of the main Adelaide mosques also held a public seminar which aimed to educate non-Muslims about some common misconceptions about Islam. The organisers sponsored a renowned American Muslim scholar to come and speak, and as a result there was a strong Muslim attendance. Non-Muslim attendance, however, was limited, and consisted mainly of older Christian men who seemed primarily interested in arguing the virtues of Christianity over Islam during public question time. While the audience appeared to maintain a quiet curiosity about this debate, the guest speaker became somewhat irritated, and none of the criticisms were resolved. Interfaith dialogue programs and events that get bogged down in theological differences do very little to challenge religious intolerance and racism (Ho 2007: 9). Racism and bigotry still need to be addressed at the local community and societal levels, but not in a discourse that confuses religious difference, values and beliefs as the source of narrow-mindedness.

Other studies find that some community activities that single out specific groups as needing special attention might not be looked upon favourably by the sections of the wider community who are already harbouring racist ideas, as they do little to challenge intolerance. For example, some non-Muslim Anglo-Australians consider that activities that aim to educate them about Islam are ‘too contrived’ when they are ‘pushed down [people’s] throats’ (Wise and Ali 2008: 93). This highlights the need to have projects which encourage more naturalistic socialisation. Such events could centre around music, theatre, sport or civic programs, where the emphasis is on cooperation and developing mutual understandings.

These might also be good opportunities to encourage further positive media exposure, which seems to elude Muslim communities in Australia. This is only in one small part due to the marketing of these events. Muslim community organisations do not have the funding, time or training to liaise with various channels of media. In large part, the media relations issues that Muslim groups collectively face is certainly a product of structural racism. This is an important social issue that goes beyond what we can address in this report. Negative media stereotypes also reinforce Muslims’ sense that Australian society does not support or include them as part of the nation (Kabir 2008). Howard Brasted brings the onus of media representations back on Muslims:

In the end, the responsibility for describing and defining the world of Islam more accurately than the Australian and Western press might have managed to do, is
the challenge facing Muslim communities in the future. For it is unlikely that the non-Muslim press will report or interpret the world – including the Muslim world – in a more understanding or low-key way than it has in the past. In a series of lectures in Australia, the Imam of New York, Siraj Wahhaj offered this blunt message: if Muslims want Islam to be promoted as a religion of tolerance, not terrorism, they will need to demonstrate this by their own actions (2001: 224).

This might suggest that Muslims should take control over media representations of their communities. A better way to go about it is to increase the bridging ties between Muslim and non-Muslim groups via better communication with media outlets, and by focusing on secular social participation and interaction, rather than on religious differences.

The fieldwork finds that the Muslim groups who focused on secular activities received the greatest level of non-Muslim participation, and a small measure of positive media coverage through a public broadcasting service. Again, this is consistent with research which has shown that secular programs have been the most successful in promoting community cohesion through sociability (Wise and Ali 2008). While this approach might possibly undermine the importance of religion to those involved in religious organisations, there seems to be some merit in gaining wider community support by engaging with the secular elements of Muslim community belonging, rather than trying to get people engaged in religious activities. The secular events held around Adelaide encourage non-Muslims to participate and allow Muslims and non-Muslim to interact in positive ways that emphasise their similarities rather than their differences. A good example of this is a community group who offer free sausage sizzles to their members. They find that many non-Muslims join their group to get free food, but this activity actually encourages socialising, and because all members automatically get the monthly newsletter by email, the non-Muslim members are kept up-to-date about the group’s activities. In another example, one representative from a Muslim education group discusses their involvement in a number of secular programs and activities, with varying degrees of success. One of their civic programs consistently enjoys a strong Muslim and non-Muslim following, and provides several opportunities to socialise face-to-face. This organisation had also launched a secular literary program, but this did not seem to attract the same level of interest from non-Muslims. At the time of the interview, it only has support from a few Muslim women.

This next section of the report will look at the role of bonding social capital in the formation and maintenance of Muslim community organisations. Considerations will be raised about the reliance of some groups on more insular ties in the provision of social services. We offer some suggestions about how these ties might be better utilised, without compromising external links and resources.

5.3 Bonding social capital

Bonding social capital refers to the systems of familial support that people might seek out through their personal networks (Putnam 2000: 22-23; Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 227). This includes comfort, personal advice and empathy, as well as more tangible forms of support such as financial and settlement assistance when they experience a personal crisis. The concept of bonding social capital has been frequently applied to community development, in the context of establishing the norms and values which hold community groups together. It is characterised by
homogenous ties, meaning that there is a degree of perceived commonality among members of a network. For example, young Muslims turn to friends who share their ethnicity in order to cope with the trauma and displacement they experienced as migrants and refugees, as they see that these friends share common experiences and values that their Anglo-Australian friends cannot really understand (Tolsma 2008).

There are a number of ways that bonding social capital might manifest among Muslim organisations, including when the members and volunteers develop close friendship ties over time. This is also the case when informal friendship and family networks become the basis of a formal organisation. One example is a sect-based group in Adelaide who started as a group of family and their friends who provided assistance to new arrivals. This group has grown to over 200 members and continues to provide a wide variety of social support and settlement services to new migrants. It also hosts regular social events for members, helping to strengthen the social connections of new arrivals, and thus bolstering their bonding social capital.

The social aspect of belonging to a group was a central attraction to becoming involved as a volunteer in these organisations. One participant describes her involvement with her local Muslim organisation as an opportunity to socialise with like-minded people. She sees that the other members had, like her, ‘Come [to Australia] at a young age or [were] born here, and so they have similar experiences’. The support of people and friends that ‘get where you’re coming from’ is discussed as an important factor to the participants who were born in Australia, as well as to those who arrived as young adults. Sawrikar and Katz (2008) also discuss the importance of culturally specific support services. They suggest that some cultural norms may inhibit seeking help from people who are not well known or trusted. This issue is also raised by one of the ordinary participants who comments that accessing mainstream services had ‘A lot to do with trust... Maybe if I developed trust with some of these agencies... perhaps I would go to them. But it would take a long time’. This highlights the importance of providing culturally relevant support services that people feel confident and comfortable using, and which provide people the option of seeking specialist assistance outside of their family or friendship networks.

There are some less productive functions of networks which depend upon high levels of bonding social capital (Portes 1998; Streeten 2002). Two Muslim community representatives mention an increased need to find new volunteers who will take over some of the civic duties currently performed by their organisations. They comment that when the Muslim population in South Australia was still relatively small, religious leaders organised and ran most of the programs, and so they provided most of the hands-on settlement support for new migrants. As Muslim migration to South Australia has risen in recent years, Muslim organisations have become more reliant on volunteer members to take on some of the more practical support services. In the seven organisations that were visited during the fieldwork, there were only four full-time paid staff members. They were therefore almost entirely dependent upon the financial and operational support of their volunteer members. Significantly, this means that crucial support services are being provided by people who are not professionally accredited to do so. This may be problematic with regards to emotional and psychological support, as even the larger organisations do not have trained social workers or professional therapists. The more informal and social assistance provided by volunteers is invaluable, but it may be insufficient in some cases where more professional intervention may be required, such as crisis counselling or occupational assistance (Ali, Milstein and Marzuk 2005).
Most Muslim community representatives interviewed discuss how their counselling services provided their assistance in terms of doing things the ‘right way’ and according to Islamic tradition. The other representatives, however, talk about being asked for legal advice, citizenship advice, financial advice and help in finding work. These organisations need to be better aware of the professional and culturally appropriate support services available through mainstream providers. The ability to refer people to such services is crucial in light of research which has suggested that some groups may be apprehensive about approaching certain mainstream services, such as mental health professionals or job network providers, due to their culturally defined notions of shame that are associated with seeking help outside of one’s family (Colic-Peisker and Tilbury 2003). In this case, smaller Muslim community support groups can provide not only the link, but also the encouragement, to seek help from professional services providers where they might be required. In order for that to happen, these Muslim organisations would need to feel confident that they can refer their members to these mainstream service providers, and there are cultural, structural, service and physical barriers that need to be addressed in order for this to happen (Sawrikar and Katz 2008). Trust is central to social networks, but so is power. On the one hand, referring members to an outside group is a bit risky, as community groups may fear compromising the strong bonding social capital between members if they start going elsewhere for support. On the other hand, developing a strong relationship with a mainstream service provider in order to feel confident in referring members requires elements of both bridging and linking social capital.

Bonding social capital can also have a negative impact when considering issues of confidentiality. The insular nature of some Muslim community organisations is problematic for some members interviewed, as the high integration prevents them from seeking help through their group. They feel scared of other members finding out about their problems and spreading this information through gossip. This meant that members needed to go elsewhere for support. This is not something which is problematic in itself, except that alternative services are difficult for them to locate. Another way to counter the negative effects of being over-reliant on bonding social capital is to provide funding to increase the number of paid staff members among the various Muslim community organisations, in order to ease their service provision. Policy and decision makers need to remain mindful of the practical and contextual barriers to the development of social capital resources, including the physical and funding needs required to increase the social inclusion of Muslims. The volunteers working for the Muslim groups studied are juggling their personal, work, school, family and other social commitments alongside their unpaid work in helping to run crucial support services. Many of the services that the organisations previously offered, such as English classes and emergency loans, are no longer viable because volunteers’ time and efforts are already over-extended and the people running the organisations do not know where to apply for funding. This puts newer Muslim arrivals at a disadvantage.

Bonding social capital is pivotal to the functioning and maintenance of community organisations. It also provides their members and clients with emotional support, friendship and charity. Given the strong value of these bonding ties, the community groups need to remain independent and to keep running things the way they want. Links with other organisations and public agents are important for the sustained
success of small community organisations, but their autonomy and self-sufficiency also need to be maintained. This would ensure the diversity in services, knowledge and forms of social capital that are important to the social development of Muslim communities around South Australia.

This leads to the key suggestion of this report: to establish what we term a South Australian Muslim Community Corporation (SAMCC). This initiative aims to facilitate the collaboration of Muslim organisations around South Australia in order to better leverage their resources and to help address the power and capital differences within these networks and other mainstream groups.

6. Developing a South Australian Muslim Community Corporation

The idea of an ABCD approach together with the issues raised by our discussion of social capital might be brought together in order to address the economic and settlement requirements of Muslim migrants. We argue that establishing a South Australian Muslim Community Corporation (SAMCC) would help to increase the resources available to organisations working with Muslim migrants. This approach can be used to bring in new stakeholders to become involved in community initiatives, including ordinary residents as well as more powerful groups and individuals who might lend their support and funding. It would also help to actively manage the power imbalances among the organisations and in their links to more powerful social agents, such as government. This section will now set out idea of the SAMCC and ways to begin addressing power struggles.

The limitations of our sample size might be seen to detract from our recommendations. The small sample size of the community organisations that were visited, their central geographic location, and the recruitment of highly educated, English-speaking community representatives mean that our findings cannot be generalised to all Muslim community organisations around South Australia. The time and resources required to conduct a larger study, however, may not necessarily benefit the various community groups. This report did not set out to present a definitive picture of all Muslim organisations or to provide all the answers for the way ahead. Rather, we propose a starting point for an evolving, grassroots initiative. In the first instance, this involves various local actors coming together to see what they might draw from the ABCD framework presented in this report, and growing it according to their own ideas and vision. The potential of the SAMCC is for community members to scope out their individual strengths, to create an inventory of their collective assets and to collaborate on a plan for social action that makes sense to their collective interests.

The idea is for communities to shape the SAMCC according to the knowledge and skills of the various organisations that exist more broadly in South Australia. Putting into effect an inclusive ABCD approach, it should consist of religious leaders, scholars, service providers and volunteers from Muslim communities around South Australia, including rural and coastal regions, which were not sampled in the current report. We suggest that the SAMCC might be a useful way to take better advantage of the linking, bridging and bonding ties of the various organisations. This asset-based community corporation would enable them to discover and mobilise their community’s assets, including those that may be currently undervalued or less
visible to other members of their community, and to collaborate in order to leverage additional support and resources. The resulting effect of such a venture is that the individual groups may ‘multiply their power and effectiveness’ (Mathie and Cunningham 2003: 476). The aims and eventual direction for the SAMCC would ultimately lie with its members, rather than being steered by an outside actor or agency. The most important result will be the connection, collaboration and dialogue between community organisations, the services they provide, and making better use of their stakeholders, including ordinary members of local communities around South Australia.

There are a number of recommendations that could precede the assembly of the SAMCC:

• Appoint a community development worker who will manage the initial stages of the SAMCC, and facilitate the first meeting. This person would have an understanding of migrant services and issues, and be capable of negotiating with other public agents if required. The continuing role for this worker would be negotiated by the SAMCC;

• Identify all the community, educational and support groups catering to Muslims in South Australia;

• Identify the social capital brokers who are connected to multiple community groups. These constitute valuable sources of information diffusion, and may assist in developing connections between groups;

• Put together a proposal for the establishment of a SAMCC for distribution to community groups and potential stakeholders, including government officials who would lend their linking capital to the initiative and ensure it moves forward. The proposal should outline the aims and projected benefits of the initiative;

• Establish to what level each interested group is willing to support the SAMCC (number of volunteers, time commitment and so on);

• Meet with each group to compile a list of the types and breadth of services that they provide, who they provide services to, what links they currently have to other services (mainstream and local), and what issues they would like to raise in the first general meeting;

• Nominate those members who are willing to attend regular meetings on behalf of their group, highlighting that different and multiple members would be encouraged to represent each group at all stages;

• Organise a general meeting with the members of the SAMCC to discuss preliminary issues, and establish a plan for action. That is, what will be the aims? How can these be achieved? What resources does each of the groups have to contribute? How might they actively manage the inclusion of all groups? How will they address power issues among member organisations and stakeholders? The use of grants is also an issue that the SAMCC may need to consider. How might they find different sources of funding to grow the individual community organisations? How might they coordinate funding initiatives together for specific common causes? Learning about one another’s success stories would be an excellent way forward;

• Develop strategies to ensure the democratic and grassroots nature of the SAMCC (described further below);

• Send meeting minutes to all participating groups and to those groups who have expressed some interest in participating but have not yet committed.
The SAMCC is in a prime position to build up the capacity of community organisations around South Australia. This includes their links to external and more powerful agents, as well strengthening the skills of community workers and local residents. Given that the SAMCC is an ABCD corporation, it would need to increase its collective resources capacity. This concerns finding new sources of funding, and ensuring that grants are used for activities that will directly benefit the community’s longevity (Glickman and Servon 1998: 506-512). The SAMCC’s special resources focus would be on helping the smaller community groups to access smaller grants from various sources, but also pooling community funds together to be used towards long-term (but still diverse) efforts. In order to build up its organisational capacity, the SAMCC would need to increase the skills of their members, particularly by fostering partnerships with other organisations outside the local community (Glickman and Servon 1998: 524-527). This should happen in a mutually supportive approach, not just by exchanging resources, but by regularly updating stakeholders on successes in order to keep their long-term commitment (Glickman and Servon 1998: 524-527). The pragmatic capacity of community development corporations requires the ongoing measurement of community organisations’ services and resources, as well as identifying new business ventures and activities (Glickman and Servon 1998: 504). We would especially stress building the leadership experience of young people, particularly from new and emerging communities.

Network capacity involves the formation of links with mainstream institution, and is an important way of increasing a community corporation’s political power (Glickman and Servon 1998: 504). We also see it as one key benefit of linking and bridging social capital. In order to work together with mainstream employment agencies, for example, the SAMCC might run training courses for human resources staff about the cultural needs, skills and knowledge of new migrants. They might also broker work placements, and utilise links to businesses and political leaders to create a work register program to help place new migrants and refugees in employment. The SAMCC might also work with the employment agencies to tailor job training courses for new migrants that address their learning and vocational gaps with a view to strengthening their cultural capital (including knowledge of the Australian job marketplace).

Glickman and Servon see political capacity as the ‘trickiest kind of capacity building’ that a new community development corporation might hope to negotiate (1998: 527). It first needs to establish trust with their communities before they can hope to broker political influence beyond it. Status attainment is a key facet of the social capital of networks (Lin 1999b). Glickman and Servon write: ‘Sharing real power with community members increases participation because the larger community is more likely to believe that its interests are being represented’ (1998: 530). The SAMCC’s management structure should be democratic and visible to the community, and conflict management should also be negotiated through open communication with all stakeholders (Glickman and Servon 1998: 530-532). The SAMCC needs to engage and sustain participation by ordinary residents, by holding regular open meetings. Residents may not be able to devote money or specific skills to particular activities, but their investment in a CDC is their time, support and ideas. Again, this requires planning and funding, but without such considerations, the SAMCC risks moving away from its grassroots objectives. The participation of hard-to-reach, disadvantaged and disengaged groups might be facilitated by scheduling several meeting times and taking into account the transport, time, access and commitments of members. Glickman and Servon suggest providing transportation and childcare.
facilities as strategies to increase participation, and establishing community members as real stakeholders (1998: 530).

In further consideration of political capacity building, federal, state and local councils allocate funding according to particular issues that the government of the day sees as important. The SAMCC needs to act as an agent that pushes for funding for issues and services that are relevant to their local residents. The onus is on the SAMCC to make visible the material and social resources that their community members see as vital, rather than waiting for funding opportunities to open up. This requires political skill and leadership, and thus investing in leadership training and pursuing links with powerful actors outside the community is vital.

Given that the people interviewed for this study identify religious leaders as having a lot of power in endorsing the success of community programs, the representatives facilitating the SAMCC need to be vigilant of issues that affect social inclusion and participation. They would need to make sure that all members of the SAMCC are afforded equal consideration. This is particularly important in relation to women, refugees and volunteers, who may not have the same social standing as, for example, Imams or Islamic scholars. Also regarding power issues, linking ties to governments, businesses and other stakeholder groups are central to ABCD corporations, and so the SAMCC will need to actively negotiate these ties. Government links need to be better utilised by Muslim organisations. At the moment, government officials attend community events as keynote speakers, but this support does little to raise the public profile of Muslim organisations. The primary role for government agents is to publicly support the SAMCC, in a way which is evident to not only those people involved in the delivery of Muslim community services, but also to the broader public of South Australia. Additionally, government agencies can provide funding and other institutional authorities, such as setting up new programs and policy initiatives that would benefit Muslim migrants. While the various levels of Australian government currently engage in community consultation, the SAMCC could facilitate this process, if it is set up to truly reflect the diverse interests, skills and knowledge of the different Muslim communities. In particular, it might better and more routinely communicate and lobby politicians on the everyday concerns of Muslim residents, rather than waiting for government agencies to set up summits or to fund research. More importantly, if the SAMCC is truly grassroots, it might facilitate connections to hard-to-reach and disengaged groups who are not easily contacted by government agencies and researchers who might be perceived as ‘outsiders’.

The SAMCC community development worker should be a strong advocate who is confident in managing its internal relations as well as its links to more powerful actors, such as government and stakeholders. This role requires a person who is capable of using good judgement as to who should intervene in the community development process, and for which specific programs or activities external involvement may be relevant (Mathie and Cunningham 2003). In order to be true to the grassroots ideals of the SAMCC, the role should be filled by a social capital broker from one of the smaller community groups. An already established community leader may (inadvertently) replicate the power interests of elite community members, rather than the ordinary residents of Muslim community groups around South Australia. The university students who belong to several community groups (discussed in the section on bridging capital) might be seen as ideal social capital brokers who would be central to the success of the SAMCC. This
term refers to people who represent a valuable social resource due to their multiple social community connections (Kilpatrick, Field and Falk 2003: 427, 430). The young community volunteers embody a strong value to their local communities, as they could help to facilitate information diffusion and collaboration. They already volunteer their time in service of their local communities, they are well educated, and they are well placed to activate and maintain linking and bridging networks. They signify an important social asset, given their strong networking skills. They would be essential in helping to plan, coordinate and lead grassroots community development programs through the SAMCC.

The issue of the visibility of Muslim organisations is one that the SAMCC might address. Its establishment would provide a valuable point of contact for anyone wanting information or assistance, or who wants to get in contact with their local Islamic group, for example, by allocating a volunteer at each mosque for one Friday evening each month, or promoting public festivities to coincide with Islamic celebrations. The SAMCC could assist in getting community groups publicly registered and listed in mainstream directories. Strengthening the visibility of positive Muslim community events and contributions via the media further requires the enactment of linking ties, as journalists and media corporations are not easily contacted and managed unless, it seems, there is some salacious or ‘sellable’ angle to a story. To this end, there may be some recourse that the SAMCC might address.

There is a great deal of positive civic participation and charitable activity performed by Muslim communities around South Australia. These activities could be better promoted at the local level through a community website in different languages, and regularly updated with upcoming events. Studies have suggested, however, that some Muslim communities experience greater socio-economic disadvantage than their non-Muslim counterparts (Betts and Healy 2006; Hassan 2009; Kabir 2007). This may limit internet access for some Muslim families who cannot afford to use the internet. Some other newly arrived Muslims may not know how to use the internet for social networking in Adelaide because they do not have strong technical or English-language knowledge to navigate the community and government portals where many of these community groups are listed. This comment bears in mind that the principal researcher of the present study experienced several problems in attempting to locate community organisations via public listings, including online. This was in spite of the fact that her mother tongue is English and that she has strong computer literacy. For this reason, the internet should not be the only means of communication and coordination by the SAMCC. It might also be beneficial to have a multi-lingual community newsletter for distribution at mosques and Muslim community centres, as well as through non-Muslim community organisations. In addition to the obvious benefits of keeping the Muslim and non-Muslim community informed about special events and their opportunities to socialise in South Australia, a community website and newsletter would also make it easier to communicate with media outlets in order to promote Muslim community events.

A further measure aimed at garnering media support would be for the SAMCC to directly contact media outlets in the event of large community activities or celebrations. Web maintenance, newsletters and press releases obviously require specialised skills and resources, and therefore funding and professional training. In addition to funding a community development worker to initiate the SAMCC, a media liaison position may be funded, so that a media professional can collect and distribute information about the SAMCC and its projects on a permanent basis. This
may initially involve engaging the services of a media consultant who could work with and train a local Muslim resident to take on this role.

To go some way in addressing problems with mainstream service referral, the SAMCC might compile a directory of culturally appropriate services for Muslim migrants. A list of mainstream agencies that provide services sensitive to the needs of cultural and religious minorities would be valuable to the groups doing the referrals, and to individuals who seek assistance or advice independent from their local community group. The process of compiling the list would also provide the opportunity to assess the adequacy of these services, and to identify where some may not be meeting service standards. The South Australian government seeks to improve cultural awareness training in the public sector, by increasing the number of qualified interpreters and by consulting with members of new and emerging communities about how programs might be better tailored to their needs (SAMEAC 2007). All mainstream support services should have, in compliance with access and equity policies, representatives from different ethnic, cultural, religious and language groups. The SAMCC might be able to work with mainstream service providers to ensure that these services are culturally competent, and accessible to the different groups of Muslim migrants living in South Australia.

The ultimate aim of the community services directory would be for people to be able to make an informed decision about where they can go to seek aid, services or counsel. This would mean that people can effectively ‘shop around’ for support services, particularly if they are apprehensive about approaching their local Muslim community organisation for fear of gossip. One of the Muslim migrant organisations that was visited during the fieldwork currently offers this service to a small degree, by offering handouts from their office with contact details of local mosques. This group, however, is limited in its ability to disseminate this information to wider groups, as their members are predominantly refugees. Other Muslims may not think to contact this group for help or referrals. The directory should be provided in the dominant community languages as well as English; at the very least, in Pashto/Dari, Bosnian, Urdu, Turkish and Arabic. It should also be distributed in hard copy through mosques and Muslim community service centres, and be made available online. This directory could also be distributed to other migrant support services and resource centres around South Australia, and could run in conjunction with SAMCC community events newsletter and website.

The final section brings together various themes of this report. We focus on the way forward from this small pilot study towards the establishment of a real-life, grassroots ABCD project that Muslim community organisations in South Australia might come together to plan and coordinate.

7. Conclusion

This report set out a preliminary investigation of the successful strategies that Muslim community organisations use in order to deliver support to Muslim migrants in the central suburbs of Greater Adelaide, South Australia. Our analysis has provided a broad overview of the types of community groups and services available to Muslims in this region; further consultation and research would be needed to better understand the issues and successful strategies of Muslims living in other areas. We have proposed sociological concepts and methods that we see as
being useful to activists, volunteers, practitioners, not-for-profit organisations, businesses and policy makers who work with South Australian Muslim migrants, or who have an interest in enhancing the socio-economic outcomes of the local communities where they live. By analysing the current state of service provision, we have outlined the potential for Muslim groups around South Australia to develop their strengths, and to create greater sense of social cohesion across organisations. The community development framework presented in this report also aims to provide a more socially inclusive system of decision making among Muslim community organisations. This may help to overcome some of the financial, resource management and program sustainability issues currently faced by smaller organisations. It may also help to empower ordinary Muslim community members to become involved in the political processes which affect their communities.

We presented a number of recommendations which aim to put Muslim communities at the centre of the decision making and evaluation process of their collective resources. Social capital is a useful theory with which to address an ABCD approach, as it acknowledges the importance of social networks in organisational success. We suggest that this is the most appropriate way to take advantage of the existing social ‘assets’ available to Muslim community groups and to encourage the sustainable growth of their programs. The ABCD approach to community building focuses on, and mobilises, existing resources of social networks, including skills, knowledge and norms that assist social solidarity.

We discussed ethnographic insights into the types of social capital resources available within Muslim community organisations, and made suggestions as to how these connections could be further developed through collaborative efforts. We suggest that establishing a South Australian Muslim Community Corporation (SAMCC) would help to pool together resources and encourage new links between Muslim organisations as well as with non-Muslim groups. The SAMCC would consist of Muslim community service providers, stakeholders, volunteers and ordinary residents who rely upon community resources. These recommendations are summarised below with respect to linking, bridging and bonding social capital.

**Linking social capital:**
- Maintain government ties, and use these to promote public awareness of community ‘success stories’ and the positive contribution of Muslim groups to the wider community;
- Revise the grants scheme. Temporary funding, while crucial to the establishment of new groups, may not encourage sustainability over the long term;
- Facilitate equitable decision making within the SAMCC by being attentive to power dynamics and encouraging inclusion of smaller grassroots community groups. It is important for representatives across all sections of the Muslim community to have equal input in the SAMCC.

**Bridging social capital:**
- Identify the social capital brokers who are connected to multiple community organisations and who might help build links between the groups;
- Encourage non-Muslim participation in community events. This may include holding mosque open days or hosting secular ‘community building’ activities;
- Develop a Muslim community events newsletter and website which is regularly updated by the SAMCC and available in multiple languages;
• Recruit a SAMCC media liaison who can disseminate information about important community events and celebrations.

Bonding social capital:
• Compile a list of culturally sensitive, mainstream service providers for distribution to all Muslim community groups and service providers. This may contribute to an audit of these services, and the identification of any gaps in service provision;
• Compile a list of Muslim community services in South Australia. This can be put on a central community website and distributed via a multi-lingual community newsletter;
• Seek funding for staff training and hiring professional staff. This is as a means to reduce the pressure on volunteer staff, and to help provide professional assistance where required, such as crisis counselling, employment and education advice.

These suggestions are designed to use the various forms of social capital possessed by South Australian Muslim groups. There are undoubtedly structural and resource requirements that will need to be met during the establishment and maintenance of this asset-based community corporation. These challenges will need to be identified and addressed by the SAMCC, with the support of other mainstream service providers, including government. It is important that key decision making remains in the hands of Muslim communities, with this report providing some suggestions and contextual information from which an ABCD approach to Muslim community development might grow. It is important that measures are taken to ensure that all members of South Australia’s Muslim communities can access adequate social and material support, and that this can be provided in a way that is culturally and religiously sensitive and respectful. An ABCD approach not only empowers local communities to help those who are most in need of social and material support; it also provides a framework through which groups can unite and help one another.

More research and consultation needs to be undertaken in order to represent the voices of those Muslims who are less socially engaged, or those voices which are unable to be captured by an outsider because of language, cultural or access issues, such as work or family commitments. These suggestions are derived from participation and observation at Muslim community events and interviews with local community members and Muslim community representatives who are leaders and service providers. In this way, the report is born through grassroots ideas and vision, and should be developed and managed through grassroots collaboration.

References


